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Series Foreword
“Media determine our situation,” Friedrich Kittler infamously wrote 
in his Introduction to Gramophone, Film, Typewriter. Although this 
dictum is certainly extreme— and media archaeology has been 
critiqued for being overly dramatic and focused on technological 
developments— it propels us to keep thinking about media as 
setting the terms for which we live, socialize, communicate, orga-
nize, do scholarship, et cetera. After all, as Kittler continued in his 
opening statement almost thirty years ago, our situation, “in spite 
or because” of media, “deserves a description.” What, then, are the 
terms— the limits, the conditions, the periods, the relations, the 
phrases— of media? And, what is the relationship between these 
terms and determination? This book series, In Search of Media, 
answers these questions by investigating the often elliptical “terms 
of media” under which users operate. That is, rather than produce 
a series of explanatory keyword- based texts to describe media 
practices, the goal is to understand the conditions (the “terms”) 
under which media is produced, as well as the ways in which media 
impacts and changes these terms.
Clearly, the rise of search engines has fostered the proliferation 
and predominance of keywords and terms. At the same time, it 
has changed the very nature of keywords, since now any word 
and pattern can become “key.” Even further, it has transformed 
the very process of learning, since search presumes that, (a) with 
the right phrase, any question can be answered and (b) that the 
answers lie within the database. The truth, in other words, is “in 
viii there.” The impact of search/media on knowledge, however, goes 
beyond search engines. Increasingly, disciplines— from sociology to 
economics, from the arts to literature— are in search of media as 
a way to revitalize their methods and objects of study. Our current 
media situation therefore seems to imply a new term, understood 
as temporal shifts of mediatic conditioning. Most broadly, then, this 
series asks: What are the terms or conditions of knowledge itself?
To answer this question, each book features interventions by 
two (or more) authors, whose approach to a term— to begin with: 
communication, pattern discrimination, markets, remain, machine— 
diverge and converge in surprising ways. By pairing up scholars 
from North America and Europe, this series also advances media 
theory by obviating the proverbial “ten year gap” that exists across 
language barriers due to the vagaries of translation and local 
academic customs. The series aims to provoke new descriptions, 
prescriptions, and hypotheses— to rethink and reimagine what 
media can and must do.
[ 1 ]
Capital’s	Media
Armin Beverungen
Why search for media in markets? The other contributions to this 
book provide two answers. One answer is that markets, at least for 
neoliberal economists, have for a long time been understood as 
information- processing machines and are designed— also on the 
basis of a number of digital media technologies— with that function 
in mind. Moreover, the political and cultural program of neolib-
eralism has sought to reconfigure states, organizations, subjects, 
and their relations in the image of “the market” at least since the 
1980s.1 One question for media theory that follows is whether 
we want to become handmaidens of engineering economists 
designing markets, to find ways of designing markets differently, or 
to design other media for a different kind of relationality. Another 
answer is that in markets we find money as a prerequisite medium, 
one that provides the general equivalent by which commodities 
can be exchanged. Money points us beyond markets, since as a 
medium it determines our situation and precedes other media, and 
it points to capital accumulation, which depends on it and which 
is historically shaped by different kinds of money. One question 
for media theory here becomes whether we want to provide a 
media archaeology of money, or get involved in building alternative 
currencies or forms of exchange and equivalence.
To situate the other contributions contained in this book within a 
media theory of markets, which is very much yet to come, we will 
2 refer to a number of debates and works that one could count and 
enroll in the project. To begin, however, it might be worth briefly 
to consider what kind of media theory of markets is not offered 
here, and why. To do so, let’s start at the so- called end of history, 
if only because the only thing that was said to survive this end was 
the market; or, rather, everything that was to exist was expected to 
pass through the market.2
The	Market	as	Invisible	Hand	and	 
Site	of	Truth
In an essay on postmodernism and the market contained in his 
book on the cultural logic of late capitalism, Fredric Jameson fa-
mously rallied his readers against the rhetoric and ideology of the 
market promoted by neoliberal economists, since the “surrender to 
the various forms of market ideology on the left . . . not to mention 
everybody else has been imperceptible but alarmingly universal” 
(1991, 263). Jameson asserted: “‘The market is in human nature’  
is the proposition that cannot be allowed to stand unchallenged;  
in my opinion, it is the most crucial terrain of ideological struggle in 
our time” (1991, 263– 64). Among other things, Jameson speculates 
on why markets have become so popular, which he finds astonish-
ing: “namely, how the dreariness of business and private property, 
the dustiness of entrepreneurship, and the well- nigh Dickensian 
flavor of title and appropriation, coupon- clipping, mergers,  
investment banking, and other such transactions . . . should in  
our time have proved to be so sexy” (1991, 274, emphasis in  
original).
The answer for Jameson resides in the “illicit metaphorical 
association” of the market with “the media itself in its largest 
contemporary and global sense (including an infrastructure of 
all the latest media gadgets and high technology),” wherein “two 
systems of codes are identified in such a way as to allow the 
libidinal energies of the one to suffuse the other” (1991, 275). 
Jameson suggests that this operation takes place in three steps: the 
3commodities produced for the market also populate our television 
screens; technological gadgets promising the end of class provide 
a pleasure that is manifest and celebrated in media consumption; 
and finally, media content itself is commodified and marketed, so 
that market and media ultimately become indistinguishable (1991, 
275– 77). Jameson here, in a cultural Marxist register, speculates 
on a media theory of markets whose principal task is to provide a 
critique of the ideology of the market at the level of representation, 
with media primarily playing the role of legitimating the market 
through associating it with jouissance.
This is not exactly the media theory of markets on offer here, since, 
at least for Philip Mirowski, it deals with less than half of the story 
that needs to be told when it comes to the rise and dominance of 
neoliberal exhortations of the market. As Mirowski has extensively 
argued elsewhere (2013), a key difference between classic liberal 
economists and neoliberal economists is that the latter no longer 
deem markets to be natural. Instead, neoliberals have, since at 
least the 1980s, been in the business of constructing markets, 
and this is where we need to direct our attention also, as media 
theorists, as digital media technologies are intimately enrolled 
in this project. Jameson, therefore, at least if we follow Mirowski, 
mischaracterizes neoliberalism and thereby misconstrues the 
political task at hand. The claim that markets are natural still gets 
made by members of the Neoliberal Thought Collective, but only 
as part of its “double- truth doctrine” (Mirowski 2013, 68– 83): the 
exoteric version of this doctrine— directed at nonmembers of the 
collective— upholds the claim that the market constitutes a spon-
taneous, natural order of exchange; the esoteric version— directed 
at members of the collective— quite happily admits that markets 
should be designed and constructed.
Nonetheless, a media theory of markets might want to ask how the 
exoteric part of the double- truth doctrine of neoliberalism func-
tions. How is it that markets are framed for us (assuming we are 
not part of the Neoliberal Thought Collective), if not as natural or 
spontaneous then as harbingers of truth? How is it that the market 
4 gains authority over practically every realm of life, as something 
God- like, most famously through the figure of the “invisible 
hand”? And how, if the market is said to offer truth, does it speak? 
Campbell Jones has, in a deconstructive, psychoanalytic register, 
explored the ascription of personhood and speech to markets. 
For Jones, to “imagine that something like the market is a kind of 
person that has a will, intentions and might speak” is “a shared 
or collective psychosis in which two or more share a common 
delusion” (Jones 2013, 20). What is particular about how the market 
speaks to us is its structural similarity to God, where the market 
is turned into “an imagined external agent with special powers” 
(17). Much like God, the market mumbles, as Jones puts it, and the 
speaking subject that is the market “involves a fundamental and 
almost permanent mystery as to which intending subject might lie 
behind the speech of the market and animate it” (38).
Although Jones focuses on the metaphysical and abstract features 
of markets and their political consequences, a media theory of 
markets might want to ask, with Jones, how precisely the market 
speaks, and how its speech is mediated. While the market appears 
largely supersensual, Jones already notes that to participate in 
markets “often involves a radical overstimulation of the senses”: 
“It is not that the market does not surround us with sounds, but 
rather what to do with these sounds and how to understand what 
it means to listen to them” (20). Jones’s focus on sound partially 
derives from one case where he engages with the media of 
markets, specifically the TickTrola,3 a software that turns financial 
market signals into music. Yet there is certainly a plethora of media 
of markets, some of which we will discuss below in relation to high- 
frequency trading.4 For contemporary media theory, it will certainly 
not come as a surprise that markets are as little disenchanted as 
media, that media might be at work in conjuring spirits (Geoghegan 
2016), or that markets involve a certain spectrality (Vogl 2015). 
So, media theory might want to turn its analytical capacities 
toward the media of markets that sustain its speech, personhood, 
and spirituality.
5One key consideration here will be to what extent a Foucauldian 
register may be built upon in this vein. The publication and 
subsequent translation of Michel Foucault’s lectures on the birth of 
biopolitics have been central to a renewed analysis of neoliberal-
ism and the way it establishes the market as a “site of veridiction” 
(Foucault 2008, 30– 37). Yet, as Mirowski (2013) and Wendy Brown 
(2015, 54) have noted, Foucault does not sufficiently distinguish 
between liberalism and neoliberalism. This is politically counter-
productive, since it associates neoliberalism with laissez faire or 
the deregulation of markets. Joseph Vogl— to take a key figure 
in German media and cultural studies writing in a Foucauldian 
register— in The Specters of Capital focuses in much detail on the 
figure of the invisible hand (2015, 23– 27 and throughout)— a liberal 
metaphor associated with laissez faire. Even as Vogl considers the 
importance of economic theory (specifically Black- Scholes) for 
the design of markets (2015, 72– 74), and discusses the media of 
markets in terms of the coincidence of the expansion of derivative 
trading with computing history and information technology (2015, 
75), this approach seems to foreclose a more careful engagement 
with the constructive side of neoliberalism.
For the exoteric part of the double- truth doctrine of the neolib-
erals, i.e. that part directed at nonmembers of the Neoliberal 
Thought Collective, what is more important than portraying the 
market as governed by an invisible hand is to claim it as a site of 
truth. In Mirowski’s view, Foucault and many who follow him take 
this part of the neoliberal doctrine too much at face value: the 
crucial feature to note is that the governmentality construed by 
the neoliberals “elevates the market as a site of truth for everyone 
but themselves” (2013, 98; emphasis in original). This is why much 
of Foucauldian scholarship on the market in neoliberalism has 
disregarded the other side of the double- truth doctrine— namely, 
how neoliberals construct markets. Neoliberals are seen as 
politicians reforming the state, not as economists reconstructing 
markets. In this way, Ute Tellmann notes, “economy never becomes 
an object of analysis in its own right; therefore the mediation of 
6 relations of power through money and objects drops from view” 
(2009, 8). The invisible hand here serves to defy “the forms of 
critical visibility commonly associated with Foucault’s work,” and 
the “invisibility of the market is directed against the very analytical 
perspective Foucault typically assumes, one aimed at detecting 
the instruments, positions, and architectures that produce such 
epistemological claims and privileges” (2009, 22).
Tellmann therefore calls for a “more typical Foucauldian approach” 
(22) to counteract this blindness. One might wonder also whether 
other strands of contemporary media theory working, for exam-
ple, with a Kittlerian reading of Foucault could contribute to this 
endeavor. Notwithstanding the reasons for the scarcity of such 
literature (outlined by Schröter in this book), Ralph and Stefan 
Heidenreich’s book on money as a dispositif of power, even if only 
loosely associated with this tradition, might be one contribution 
(Heidenreich and Heidenreich 2008).
Neoliberal	Engineering	and	 
Market Design
This is where Mirowski’s work with Edward Nik- Khah here and 
in their book entitled The Knowledge We Have Lost in Information 
(2017) comes in. In their contribution to this volume, Nik- Khah and 
Mirowski unravel the “deep history” of Friedrich Hayek’s impact on 
the economics profession, in particular the way in which his views 
on information in markets correspond to key precepts of emerging 
approaches to market design. In so doing, our authors contend 
that despite the economists’ version of history in which Hayek 
has hardly been influential in orthodox economics, “neoliberalism 
has occupied the profession’s heartland, and has planted its flag.” 
While Nik- Khah and Mirowski show how market design is “the 
unintended consequence of orthodox economists grappling with 
themes introduced by Hayek,” today market design “constitutes the 
precepts of neoliberalism taken to their logical conclusion.” It is not 
simply the market as governed by an invisible hand, but the market 
7as an “omnipotent processor of information” (emphasis in original), 
which justifies the reorganization of the economic lifeworld on the 
basis of markets.
Around a decade ago, Mirowski had suggested that a key challenge 
for intellectual history to come would be to explain how economics, 
which had “eschewed most considerations of the specificity of mar-
kets” subsequently managed to convince others that it “possessed 
special expertise to construct all manner of actual usable markets, 
tailor- made for their narrowly specified purposes” (2007, 218). 
This is partly what his project with Nik- Khah is about, taking up the 
history of the relation between information theory and economics 
provided in Machine Dreams (Mirowski 2002) by writing the history 
of the economics of information and extending it up to the pres-
ent.5 This history is one where the market becomes an information 
processor, tasked with the epistemic challenge of “serving as 
the primary mechanism for the validation of truth” (Mirowski in 
Lash and Dragos 2016, 130), as Foucault had already recognized. 
What Nik- Khah and Mirowski add to Foucault’s account is the 
role information theory plays in this story, and that this is closely 
related to the influence of Hayek, so that “you can’t understand the 
spread of the idea of a market as an information processor without 
understanding the concomitant rise of neoliberalism” (130).
Contrary to prevalent historical accounts of Hayek’s work, Nik- Khah 
and Mirowski argue that there are three phases to Hayek’s view 
on information, which lead to different schools of market design. 
The first phase is part of the Socialist Calculation Controversy, 
where Hayek argues that knowledge is dispersed and therefore 
planning faces huge epistemological difficulties, but the market can 
act as a “mechanism for the communication of information.” This 
view is today visible in what our authors (in their 2017 book) call 
the Walrasian School of Design, but do not discuss further here. 
A media theory might want to intervene here to revisit the earlier 
controversies, since some important recent work by Eden Medina 
on Project Cybersyn in Chile (2014) and by Ben Peters on the 
Soviet Internet (2016) offers not just a conceptual but technological 
8 history of socialist calculation. Even if these are mostly histories of 
failure or at least of premature endings, they certainly demonstrate 
that for many the controversy was not simply won by Hayek, and 
perhaps these histories of media provide different avenues for 
thinking (and designing) alternatives to neoliberal markets.
The second phase of Hayek’s views on information and knowledge, 
where knowledge is considered to be not just inarticulate but tacit 
and inaccessible, and the market’s role is to make this knowledge 
accessible for calculation, corresponds to the Bayes- Nash School of 
Design. Here Hayek considers rationality itself to be largely uncon-
scious. It would be curious for media theorists to read this Hayek 
alongside the recent work of N. Katherine Hayles on the cognitive 
nonconscious (2017), perhaps to note some correspondences and 
differences between neoliberal economics and theories of the non-
human. Importantly, where Hayek’s view on unconscious rationality 
leads to an evacuation of knowledge from the human, so that the 
human is mired in radical ignorance while the market provides 
ultimate truth, Hayles does provide an account of human- machine 
assemblages in which the human is not simply stupid or ignorant.
Hayek’s third view further displaces the human as the subject of 
knowledge, where he introduces a “species of knowledge not ‘known’ 
by any individual human being at all ” (Nik- Khah and Mirowski, this 
volume, emphasis in original), with Hayek then replacing the term 
knowledge with the term information. Where the individual actor be-
comes ignorant, the market in turn becomes a “Super Information 
Processor.” This in Nik- Khah and Mirowski’s account leads to the 
Experimentalist School of Design, which, acknowledging its debt 
to Hayek, focuses on computational capacities of markets, doesn’t 
trust agents and their cognitive capacities, and offloads the task of 
information processing onto markets in designing “smart  
markets.”
Our authors contend that this is the school of market design that 
is winning out, and in their discussion of Alvin Roth’s work in the 
concluding section of their chapter, they show what bleak futures 
9this envisions and prepares for us. Economists have become 
apolitical pragmatists, who design markets for every part of our 
lives, with the help of artificial intelligence. These markets operate 
no longer for what people want, but regardless of their wants. We 
offload thinking onto markets, which are increasingly designed to 
be devoid of people; only engineering economists have a stake and 
agency in their operation.6
Cathedrals	of	Computation	and	Finance
Now at this point one might take a step back and return to 
Jameson’s gesture. Here we find a not so- illicit and more- than- 
metaphorical association of markets with media— no longer with 
television but with computers. More precisely, as market design 
embraces computation and artificial intelligence, it enters what 
Ian Bogost (2015) has called the “cathedral of computation,” where 
computers are imbued with theological powers, which rub off on 
markets. Yet the association between markets and media is now 
even more direct: markets are designed on the basis of digital 
media technologies. This is perhaps most visible in automated trad-
ing in financial markets, and particularly in high- frequency trading. 
These developments build on a long history in which financial mar-
kets “have been structured by the close connection between price 
formation on stock exchanges and innovations in media technolo-
gy,” as Vogl (2015, 75) recounts with reference to the telegraph, the 
ticker tape, and other media of markets. These media technologies 
seem archaic in light of the “billion- dollar technological arms race” 
that has gripped the global financial market as “the world’s largest 
and most powerful techno- social system” (Johnson et al. 2013, 1).7
We can witness this, for example, when providers of market 
infrastructure drill through mountains to provide more direct links 
between exchanges, for the purpose of shaving a few milliseconds 
off information flows in which the speed of light comes to matter 
as a natural limit to the speed of trading (MacKenzie et al. 2012). In 
high- frequency trading, every millisecond counts. The introduction 
10 of microwaves and other technologies to overcome latency has 
created further information inequalities at different speeds; the 
focus on information equality in co- location facilities at data 
centers demonstrates rather than alleviates this (Zook and Grote 
2017). In this way, high- frequency trading perpetuates concentra-
tions of wealth and power (Golumbia 2013). Yet these may also 
be undermined, as these media technologies achieve what the 
neoliberals imagined. As Michael Lewis famously explored in Flash 
Boys, the same market does not exist for everyone— you may never 
be able to buy or sell at a price given to you, if a high- frequency 
trader has faster access to the order book of the exchange and can 
front- run you (see Lanchester 2014). The result of this, ultimately, 
is that no agent can know the market, since no one can rely on the 
data provided— only “the market” knows.
The social studies of markets and finance literature is perhaps the 
closest we have already to a media studies of markets. Some of this 
literature explicitly builds upon Mirowski’s earlier work on informa-
tion in markets and introduces a consideration of media. Consider, 
for example, Juan Pablo Pardo- Guerra’s (2010) work on the au-
tomatization of the London Stock Exchange, which argues that the 
category of information in markets is not given but is constructed 
in sociotechnical assemblages of financial markets, which change 
with media revolutions. Pardo- Guerra “socializes” the category of 
information in this way via a media history of markets. Or consider 
recent work by Tero Karppi and Kate Crawford (2016) exploring, 
through the example of the “hack crash” of April 23, 2013, caused 
by a hacked AP Twitter account announcing a terrorist attack on 
the White House, the infrastructural relations of social media 
and automated financial trading. In their view, these algorithmic 
connections produce a kind of machine ecology among other 
things displacing the human as a knowledgeable market actor. 
Ann- Christina Lange, Marc Lenglet, and Robert Seyfert also note, 
in their introduction to a collection on cultures of high- frequency 
trading, how the centrality of questions of “epistemic uncertainty” 
in high- frequency trading results from “the promise . . . that objec-
11tivity and profitability can be realized through the use of numerical 
codes and material infrastructures” (2016, 161).
How would a media theory of markets, informed by Nik- Khah and 
Mirowski’s work on the complicity of market design with neoliber-
alism, build upon this work? Now, even a cursory reading of those 
parts of the literature informed by actor- network theory (ANT) 
specifically shows very quickly that much of it is far removed from 
the kind of political and critical program that Nik- Khah and Mirows-
ki propose here in their reading of engineering economics and 
market design as neoliberal. In fact, our authors have elsewhere 
(Mirowski and Nik- Khah 2008) expressed serious criticisms vis- à- vis 
particular varieties of this work proposed by Bruno Latour, Michel 
Callon, and Donald MacKenzie. In brief, their point of criticism is 
that the presumed “performativity” of economics, which specifically 
the more recent variants of ANT engages, is far too congruent 
with the neoliberal project of constructing markets. The authority 
of neoliberal economists in constructing markets is too easily 
taken for granted, very little is added to the account of the market 
designers, and ANT aligns itself politically with their work. In doing 
so, ANT doesn’t acknowledge the specificity of the actors from 
economics (such as game theorists or experimental economists) 
and their divergent agendas, and they discount and ignore other 
key actors in political economy such as states and corporations— 
but also media.
There are, however, parts of the literature on high- frequency 
trading that do take the “notorious quasi- material shape- shifter the 
computer” (Mirowski and Nik- Khah 2008, 118) left out by ANT into 
account, and thereby come to the conclusion that the performativ-
ity thesis “does not suffice to explain the spatial relations that now 
perform or shape the interaction that plays out between adaptive 
algorithms” (Lange 2017, 103; on performativity, see also Schröter 
2017). It is this literature, drawing on media theory to understand 
the topology of financial markets and their media technological 
constitution, that a media theory of markets could build upon.
12 Money’s	Strange	Absences
Jens Schröter’s contribution to this volume picks up here, with an 
attempt to assess the contribution of the work of Michel Callon 
and Bruno Latour for a media theory of money. Where, perhaps 
unexpectedly, in the neoclassical economic tradition discussed by 
Nik- Khah and Mirowski, by and large “the concept of the market 
was treated as a general symptom for the phenomenon of ex-
change itself, and hence rendered effectively redundant” (Mirowski 
and Nik- Khah 2008, 89– 90), Schröter sees money similarly ignored 
in media theory. The same may be true for economics. David 
Graeber, in his five- thousand- year history of debt, which is also 
an anthropological history of money, notes that in economics: 
“Money is unimportant. Economies— ‘real economies’— are really 
vast barter systems” (2011, 44– 45). Money is considered necessary 
but coincidental to generalized exchange in markets. As the latest 
anthropologist to uncover the economists’ “myth of barter” (see 
Maurer 2013), Graeber insists that money did not come into being 
as people discovered the limits of barter and wanted to trade more 
freely in markets. Rather, money comes into being with debt, which 
requires money in order to be quantified: “money and debt appear 
on the scene at exactly the same time“ (Graeber 2011, 21).
Let’s provide a little background to Schröter’s undertaking. This 
critique of two representatives of ANT contributes to a wider proj-
ect that Schröter is involved in with his collaborator Till Heilmann, 
namely to constitute and develop a “neo- critical media studies,” 
in which a media theory of money plays a key role (Schröter and 
Heilmann 2016). Drawing on a resurgence in a critique of political 
economy after the 2007– 8 financial crisis, Schröter and Heilmann 
seek to reinvigorate a critical media studies that, at least in its 
German variant (see Horn 2008; Pias 2016), has very little to say 
about capitalism. They, for example, note that Friedrich Kittler’s 
materialism is not historical or concerned with social or social- 
technical relations but merely with technical apparatuses, so that 
it constitutes a materialism not of relations but of things. They 
13liken Kittler’s dismissal of the social tout court to neoliberal rhetoric 
(“there is no society” Margaret Thatcher famously proclaimed) and 
suggest it already points to ANT’s equally assertive dismissal of the 
social. The critical thrust of Kittler’s media materialism in that way 
targets not the economic relations of the capitalist social order, 
but his historical genealogies unmask only the particular economic 
interests and strategies of individual actors (Schröter and Heilmann 
2016, 10– 12).
Schröter and Heilmann suggest that a neo- critical media studies 
should concentrate on three inputs to establishing a relation 
between a theory of capitalism and a theory of media: (1) it should 
systematically explicate the media- theoretical contribution to the 
description of money, as opposed to economic, philosophical, and 
sociological conceptualizations; (2) it should historically develop 
a “monetary media archaeology” that understands media history 
to be essentially marked by the forms and functions of money; 
and (3) this should lead not only to a historical reformulation but 
also a critical evaluation of media history, in which technics, as a 
specific form in which capitalist sociality reproduces itself, appears 
in its historicity and contingency (2016, 22– 23). Money, then, is the 
potential link between a theory of media and a theory of capital; it 
becomes central to making media studies critical and to a media 
theoretical contribution to the critique of capital. Money offers 
itself up as the capitalist medium, as a medium that makes capital 
possible and potentially makes all other media capitalist. Schröter’s 
contribution here, then, is part, alongside some other preliminary 
texts (Schröter 2011; 2016), of a project to sketch this media theory 
of money, which will also yield a book. Yet apart from an empirical 
observation that media seem to determine our situation, and 
the preliminary discussions of money as a medium in Marshall 
McLuhan and elsewhere, why is money so central for Schröter?
Key to Schröter’s understanding of money is his engagement with 
contemporary Marxian theoretical currents. Where on previous 
occasions Schröter already called for an encounter of media 
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et al. 2006),8 here and elsewhere (in particular Schröter 2011) 
he builds on the tradition of the “critique of value,” which is only 
slowly being received in Anglophone debates (see Larsen et al. 
2014 for a collection of translated texts in the journal Mediations). 
This current, which is organized around the two German- language 
online journals Krisis and Exit!, is perhaps most well- known for its 
critique of Marxist and social democratic politics embracing labor. 
It sees labor as a coercive social principal, with labor subsumed in 
the machinations of capital as its other, so that labor is something 
not to be freed but something we need to free ourselves from— the 
“Manifesto Against Labour” ends with the demand: “Workers of all 
countries, call it a day!” (Krisis- Group 1999). This Marxian current 
thus distinguishes itself quite significantly from other currents such 
as cultural Marxism or autonomist Marxism, also with regards to its 
emphasis on circulation and the dominance of the valorization of 
value as the primary force of history in capitalism, as its “automatic 
subject” (Kurz 1999; Schröter 2011), leading to a structural crisis of 
capitalism.
Money is central here, since, as Robert Kurz puts it: “Within this 
system, money is the tangible form of the appearance of value, 
which is linked to itself. In the self- expanding movement of 
capital, which breeds money out of money, money becomes a 
relentless and restless end- in- itself” (1999, np). The valorization 
of value— the very definition of capital— is an end- in- itself, as the 
authors regularly state, and money is its medium. Schröter (2011, 
222– 23) explicates how in the critique of value money appears as 
“Selbstzweck- Medium,” as “medium as end- in- itself,” that is, as the 
medium that represents the most abstract form value can take in 
its self- valorization. We can see how, if Schröter follows this line 
of analysis, money can be understood as the most important and 
widespread medium today that determines our situation.9 It is also 
the medium of capital, and dealing with money may also lead us to 
a critique of capital. Yet is the concept of money as medium we find 
in the critique of value already sufficient, so that there would be 
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is clearly not the case. Kurz certainly provides a clue and challenge 
for a media theory of money when he writes: “abstract wealth in 
the form of money is by its nature limitless and interminable, and 
only its material content is subject to an absolute historical limit”; 
and “there can be no accumulation without its material bearer, 
however much the latter’s absence would be the ideal of capital” 
(Kurz in Larsen et al. 2014, 50).
Yet it is not clear at all whether Kurz here and elsewhere also con-
siders money as a “material bearer” of value. But it must certainly 
bug a media theorist that precisely these Marxians, who insist 
regularly on the necessity precisely to not ignore materiality, when 
it comes to money seem to systematically ignore or at least neglect 
its materiality and mediality, because they see in it the most 
abstract and pure— and therefore immaterial— form of capital. At 
the same time, conversely, it clearly bothers Schröter that media 
theory pays so little attention to the abstractions of capital. For ex-
ample, in a critique of general ecology— a competing contemporary 
current of media theory associated with Erich Hörl (see Hörl 2015, 
and most recently Hörl 2017)— Schröter (2014) laments how there 
the future of media is discussed without reference to the social or 
economic relations that mark them, and he sets out to uncover the 
“economic unconscious” of general ecology. If we set this project 
alongside Kurz’s consideration of how capitalist abstraction marks 
reality, where he notes that it “is through money that society 
encounters its own unconscious abstraction as an independent, 
alienated power” (1999), we can see how money becomes the 
primary means by which to uncover the economic unconscious of 
media theory, and of our times.
Elements	of	a	Media	Theory	of	Money
Schröter, then, explores media theory to develop an understanding 
of the mediality and materiality of money. Before proceeding with 
his critique of Callon and Latour, he gathers elements of a media 
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argues against those, such as Norbert Bolz and Jochen Hörisch, 
who, in drawing on Niklas Luhmann’s definition of money as “sym-
bolically generalized medium of exchange,” see money as mostly 
an abstract, immaterial medium. Considering the relation between 
the symbolism and materialism of money, Schröter notes that 
certainly the materiality and mediality of money is not simply an 
“earthly remainder” which capital will one day be able to abandon 
(see the discussion of Kurz above). Rather, agreeing with Walter 
Seitter and Hartmut Winkler, money always relies on material 
infrastructures and law, so that its materiality, Schröter argues, 
constitutes “a very precondition of the operability of money as such” 
(this volume, emphasis in original). Trust in money is precisely a 
question of the relation between the symbolic and infrastructural 
in money. This is for Schröter the “first, decisive step toward an 
analysis of money from the perspective of media theory.”
To proceed, Schröter suggests engaging with other disciplines such 
as philosophy, sociology, and economics in search of traces of a 
media theory of money. We would add anthropology, which per-
haps offers the most detailed history of money, with some implicit 
media archaeology (see Maurer 2006). This literature also becomes 
key in considering Schröter’s argument that follows. He suggests 
there are two key aspects that qualify materials as potential 
money: durability and countability. Money must be durable so that 
it can act as store of value and can travel the distances of trade. 
It must be countable so that it can serve as a measure of value, 
and to attach numbers as values to things. Here Schröter notes, 
drawing on Seitter and Alexander Galloway, that money is already 
digital, that this already makes the mathematization of production 
implicit to capitalism, and that therefore “Capitalism is from its very 
beginning the formalization and digitization of economy, even of 
society as a whole.” While this in itself challenges contemporary 
accounts of the digital economy, the central argument Schröter 
makes follows. Because money can be counted, practices of 
counting proliferate, and there can be more or less of everything. 
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specificity of money leads (at least potentially) to the phenomenon of 
accumulation.”
Let’s pause for a moment to consider the implications of this 
statement. A weak interpretation would be that capital requires 
money, that there can be no capital without money, since nothing 
can be accumulated and thereby no valorization of value can 
take place. There would be little reason to contest this historically 
or conceptually. Yet Schröter also seems to imply more: it is 
because of money that capital can exist and comes into being in 
the first place. While accumulation is impossible without money, 
money itself leads— “at least potentially”— to accumulation. That 
is certainly an unusual assertion, considering various accounts of 
the emergence of capitalism, in which money does not play such 
a central role— notwithstanding the economists’ “myth of barter” 
in which money is invented to make generalized commodity 
exchange (another definition of capitalism) possible. Now, Schröter 
hesitates to expand on these strong implications of his statement, 
turning it into a question of the relation between the medium of 
money and society, in which he wants to avoid a certain media 
determinism. He suggests that “this complicated problem (which 
at least is the problem of the emergence of capitalism as such) is 
better described as a kind of co- constitution of money and capital” 
(this volume, emphasis in original).
What could this co- constitution amount to? A cursory glance at 
anthropological literature on money questions this coincidence of 
money and capital tout court. By now quite notoriously, Graeber 
(2011) writes the history of money as the history of debt, and, as 
we noted above, money enters the stage of history with debt— not 
with capital. We encounter various kinds of money before we en-
counter capital, both in Graeber’s story and also in other anthropo-
logical histories and contemporary accounts of money (see Maurer 
2006; 2015). In fact, Graeber notes that certain kinds of interest- 
bearing loans, as early forms of debt, even “appear to predate 
writing” (Graeber 2011, 64)— which can only lead to speculation 
18 as to how such loans were accounted for. How then can we insist, 
with Schröter, that money coincides with capital? Do Graeber and 
the anthropologists perhaps have a different conception of money, 
or does the money they encounter follow different, noncapitalist 
scripts? One aspect of Graeber’s account is potentially congruent 
with Schröter’s argument. Graeber notes that a consequence of the 
imposition by states and the subsequent extensive use of money 
led to a different relation to objects and value. At the origins of 
capitalism, we don’t find “the gradual destruction of traditional 
communities by the impersonal power of the market”; instead, 
we discover how “an economy of credit was converted into an 
economy of interest” (Graeber 2011, 332).
Money in Graeber’s account destroys relations of credit that 
formed social life before it was separated into realms of the 
economy and all else, and the economy of interest is marked by a 
morality that demands that interest be paid on debt, in that sense 
foreshadowing the valorization of value. Graeber’s insight poten-
tially refines Schröter’s argument, which could in this way take into 
account how state currencies precipitated the birth of capitalism, 
and how money was perhaps imbued with the kinds of scripts that 
make it coincide with capital. This is also key in relation to current 
discussions around the design of alternative currencies such as 
Bitcoin (see Lovink et al. 2015). Schröter notes how Micronesian 
stone money might have been imbued with an excessive materi-
ality precisely to block accumulation. Bitcoin, the most notorious 
of the new cryptocurrencies, today tries something similar, in that 
bitcoins are limited and at one point mining bitcoins for the veri-
fication of the blockchain will no longer be possible. Now Bitcoin 
can hardly be offered here as a currency that eschews capital; as 
David Golumbia (2016) has forcefully argued, Bitcoin expresses a 
certain “right- wing extremism” in that its open avoidance of state 
regulation and taxation and its media technological setup mean 
it has become an object of speculation and extremely unequal 
distribution of wealth. Nonetheless, Bitcoin does not simply seem 
to provide the same kinds of scripts as state currencies, and for a 
19media theory of money it may well be worthwhile to explore how 
these scripts work and where they lead us.
Schröter also mentions financial derivatives in passing, noting that 
they stem from the same “basic mathematical logic of money” we 
mentioned above. That may be the case, yet what kind of discon-
tinuities with earlier forms of money mark derivatives? Accounts 
like those of Dick Bryan and Michael Rafferty in their book on 
capitalism with derivatives (2006) suggest that much is at stake. 
They acknowledge that derivatives “perform functions integral to 
accumulation” (2006, 5) and that, “as a commodification of risk, 
derivatives are a form of calculation and market transaction that 
is intrinsic to the logic of a capitalist economy” (8). Yet they also 
note that derivatives “are bringing some profound changes to the 
way capitalism is organized: changes as fundamental as the nature 
of capitalist ownership, the nature of money, and the process of 
competition” (9). Derivatives have become a kind of “meta- capital 
whose distinctive role is to bind and blend different sorts of ‘par-
ticular’ capital together,” providing monetary functions in allowing 
different bits of capital to be priced (13), and thereby intensifying 
competition between capital and putting pressure on labor. More 
than simply continuing previous scripts, then, derivatives and 
their (post– Black- Scholes) scripts confirm and extend Schröter’s 
account of the coincidence of money and capital: money’s scripts 
are dependent upon its mediality, and with derivatives money’s 
coincidence with capital takes on new qualities.
Repressions	of	ANT
At this point we can briefly discuss Schröter’s critique of Michel 
Callon and Bruno Latour. Schröter turns to ANT for a conceptu-
alization of the determinations of money, but what he finds is 
a repression of money and the disregard in Callon and Latour 
of some basic postulates of ANT, which he seeks to recover for a 
media theory of money. There are two points to Schröter’s criticism 
of Callon’s understanding of capitalism. First, as Callon denies 
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“praxeological fallacy”: for Callon there are lots of capitalisms with a 
small “c,” but how can we even call these capitalisms when we don’t 
acknowledge that there is something like “capital” that they have 
in common? For Schröter, this makes little sense and a “radical 
praxeocentrism” is “logically impossible” (emphasis in original). Sec-
ond, although Schröter acknowledges that Callon’s work on calcu-
lative devices is quite useful for understanding how markets are 
constituted, what is missing in Callon for Schröter is any account 
of value. It is simply unclear what is calculated, and “value” largely 
only appears in Callon’s text as a moral term, not an economic one.
Now for Callon the point of focusing on practices of calculation is 
precisely to negate the idea that there is a “great divide” between 
capitalism and its prehistory. Here Schröter returns to money. 
Whereas he agrees with Callon that money and therefore calcu-
lation exists prior to capitalism, what matters is that with the rise 
of capitalism, society comes to be centered around money and its 
scripts: namely M- C- M’— that is, the valorization of value in which 
money is transformed into commodities and back again in order to 
yield more money. Although devices are supposed to play a central 
role in Callon’s approach, Schröter argues that Callon “follows the 
neoclassical mainstream’s exclusion and oblivion of money,” and 
thereby ignores money as a medium with certain scripts. Where 
he also follows the economists is in focusing on markets rather 
than production. For Callon commodities are framed as such; only 
the framing of things in markets with the help of money turns 
them into commodities. Schröter argues that this is simply false, 
since a capitalist society is precisely one in which commodities are 
produced for markets. In proceeding in this way, Callon erases the 
basic logic of capitalism, by tearing apart the relation of money and 
the commodity in the process of accumulation.
This becomes particularly apparent to Schröter in a discussion of a 
quote by Callon in which he discusses how money’s symbolism can 
easily be changed, e.g. when a grandmother gives her grandchild 
a silver coin, which the grandchild subsequently doesn’t treat as 
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is money, and even if the grandmother were to create “private 
money,” the latter can’t be considered money at all. Money has “an 
irreducible script that cannot be easily changed by different practices” 
(emphasis in original), but Callon simply ignores this script. Now 
the anthropological accounts, including the one by Viviana Zelizer 
on which Callon draws (see also Maurer 2006; Graeber 2011), 
partially support Schröter’s critique of Callon in that they wouldn’t 
suggest that money’s scripts can so easily be changed. Yet these 
accounts also point to how, in history, there have often been many 
moneys in existence, and they have produced their own econo-
mies. As contemporary work for example with regards to mobile 
money like M- Pesa (Maurer 2015) shows, mobile money functions 
to a certain extent independently of state currencies. Certainly, 
most of the examples of mobile money are pegged to state 
currencies, but they also in certain ways defy commensurability, 
and the control of their volume exceeds the capacities of central 
banks. Schröter rightly points out that M- Pesa and other kinds 
of mobile money aren’t “private money” but stand in a complex 
relation to state currencies. The challenge here is, then, to explain 
how money’s scripts remain stable despite the ways the symbolism 
of money is adapted in practice, and how state currencies relate 
to other moneys and remain dominant despite other moneys that 
offer potentially different forms of exchange and equivalence.
Schröter’s critique of Latour proceeds along similar lines. Schröter 
doesn’t deny that it might be productive to think of money as an 
immutable mobile, but there are two ways in which Latour treats 
money that disturb him. The first is that Latour seems to insist on 
the symmetry of immutable mobiles, whereas for Schröter this 
would be a premise but not a conclusion one can arrive at once we 
notice how money determines our situation. Money also deter-
mines other immutable mobiles due to its centrality in capitalist 
societies; it is therefore “precisely not one immutable mobile among 
others, but their conditio sine qua non” (emphasis in original). In a 
footnote Schröter qualifies this and notes that one better speaks 
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however “money is ultimately, unlike other immutable mobiles, 
never dispensable.” The second criticism of Latour is that his 
whole model is based on assuming there is an agonistic situation, 
and that immutable mobiles are enrolled to assert one’s position. 
For Schröter, this assumption is unacceptable for an ANT that 
seeks to avoid universals and doesn’t prefer any kinds of social 
aggregates. Yet much like Thomas Hobbes’s “war of all against all,” 
Latour seems to presume that we are always already stuck in a 
competitive, agonistic situation. Latour seems to precisely assume 
the market to be ahistorical, whereas its institution needs to be 
explained. Money seems to be the model for immutable mobiles, 
but, Schröter argues, this is repressed.
Schröter doesn’t stop with a total dismissal of Callon, Latour, and 
ANT. Rather, he wants to rescue ANT from the “double repression of 
money in the discourse of ANT: One concerning the relation between 
money and human actors and one concerning the relation between 
money and nonhuman actors” (emphasis in original). What would 
an actor- network theory look like without this double repression? 
Perhaps some of this is already visible in the kinds of social studies 
of finance and markets we explored above. Recent work in eco-
nomic anthropology, drawing quite extensively on traditions of 
ANT, might also yield some important contributions on which a 
media theory of money could build, by focusing on capitalization as 
a notion “indefectibly related, more or less literally, to the mundane 
idea of capital: money, or something comparable, that can be used 
to make more money, or something comparable” (Collectif CSI 
2017, 12).
At the very end of his contribution, Schröter suggests that the 
critique of money might point to “the possibilities of postmonetary 
societal structures.” If, in doing so, we want to avoid Proudhonist 
traps and the fantasy that by simply getting rid of money we can 
also get rid of capital, Kurz warns that the “emancipatory ‘abolition 
of money’ is only possible in the context of an abolition of the 
labor- substance, its value- form, and the complementary, socially 
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cur, which means that, as long as we are not content with building 
alternative currencies that might lead to some (minor?) alternatives 
within capitalism, a media theory might also need to think about 
contributing to a more extensive project of critiquing and disman-
tling capital. At least that seems to be in the cards for Schröter.
This volume, then, searches for media in markets through various 
pathways. Edward Nik- Khah and Philip Mirowski primarily con-
centrate on unmasking contemporary economists occupied with 
market design as neoliberals in their adherence to key precepts 
of Hayekian information theory. Since information theory is key 
to understanding contemporary economics, and economists are 
involved in building markets also with the help of media technol-
ogies, media studies here face the challenge of coming to terms 
with how dominant the computer has become as a metaphor, 
model, and actual media technological basis of markets. Rather 
than becoming handmaidens of the neoliberal market designers 
(Mirowski and Nik- Khah 2008), media theory is here invited to con-
sider how it can contribute both to unmasking how the dominance 
of markets is supported by the metaphorical power of computers 
in the “cathedrals of computation” (Bogost 2015), and to conceiving 
alternatives to the dominance of neoliberal markets, perhaps in 
drawing on contemporary work in media studies that conceives 
of other forms of computing the economy and different human– 
machine relations (Medina 2014; Peters 2016; Hayles 2017), as well 
as work in the social studies of finance and markets.
Jens Schröter focuses on excavating a media theory of money from 
existing media theory and drawing on the Marxian tradition of the 
critique of value. Money determines our situation, in Schröter’s 
view, and in exploring how precisely money as the primary medium 
of capital’s valorization of value conditions both other media and 
the world around us in general, media theory can contribute to 
a burgeoning critique of capital. To do so, however, it must first 
excise its own economic unconscious. The challenge for media 
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money and a critique of capital, and perhaps to consider its role in 
designing different forms of money, whether cryptocurrencies or 
mobile moneys, which may not be so easily amenable to capitalist 
accumulation, and which would certainly have to escape Silicon 
Valley’s not- so- unconscious economic drives in the form of venture 
capital and speculation on our media technological futures. Recent 
debates around commons propose an end to capitalism, with 
the commons as the cell- form of a “commonism” opposed to the 
commodity as the cell- form of capital (see Beverungen et al. 2013). 
While these commons might require their special kind of money 
that defies accumulation (see Terranova and Fumagalli in Lovink et 
al. 2015), efforts are also underway to conceive of societies beyond 
money.10 This invention of life beyond money is certainly a task 
beyond media theory (see also Berardi in Lovink et al. 2015).
Now, this is a volume in search of media in markets, and perhaps 
it is symptomatic of media studies’ economic unconscious that 
the term that was set here isn’t “capital,” even if, more or less 
explicitly, both contributions are framed in larger projects involving 
precisely a critique of neoliberal capital. Yet, this roundabout way, 
proceeding via markets and money, might still be a suitable path. 
Michael Mayer (2006) has taken the direct path in considering 
capital as medium. He importantly refers to colonial history, specifi-
cally to Christopher Columbus’s “discovery” of the New World as 
thoroughly determined by capitalist speculation and the prepa-
ration of that new world for capital accumulation, and to Adam 
Smith’s blindness toward slavery as an effect of capital understood 
as an operational medium or dispositif that does not see what it 
systematically denies (i.e. the colonial and other violence of prim-
itive accumulation). Mayer sees, extending Foucault, the “totally 
economized life” as having become a fact since 1989 (Mayer 2016, 
129), and he tries to account for it via capital as a medium that 
shapes our relationship to reality and can be read in its performa-
tive effect. Yet this life precisely becomes decipherable not through 
reference to an “autonomous market” or its “invisible hand” (even if 
25these are understood as features of a programmatic marketization) 
but through the combined projects that Nik- Khah and Mirowski 
and Schröter propose here: a sociohistorical account of the 
politico- scientific neoliberal project, and a media- archaeological 
account of money as medium of capital.
Mayer’s conclusion that “capital as medium determines our situa-
tion” (2016, 145) certainly chimes with Schröter’s contribution, but 
it is precisely a move away from a focus on capital as an abstract 
worldview or relation, which still reverberates in Mayer’s text, to-
ward a focus on markets, money, and their media technologies that 
offers much more explanatory power for the history of capital and 
its medial constitutions. In taking on such a task, this contribution 
suggests, media studies must also take stock of some of the key 
traditions that have shaped the field, whether these derive from 
Marxism, Foucault, Kittler, or ANT, and to engage with key debates 
today, for example around financial markets, cryptocurrencies, and 
mobile money, in which we can already perceive a media theory to 
come. In that way, media studies might be able to escape the capi-
talist realism (Fischer 2009) that marks future visions of cybernetic 
capitalism (Tiqqun 2001) and that is enabled and sustained also by 
media technologies.
Notes
 1 ”Neoliberalism” is a widely used yet highly contested term, and media theorists 
might be hesitant to use it. For reasons why it is an indispensable term for 
political- economic analysis today, see Mirowski (2014) and Davies (2016).
 2 What is noteworthy about Fukuyama (1992) is that he speaks of liberalism 
and free- market economics rather than neoliberalism. For a comment on how 
financial markets imagine an end of history where the future “is always already 
priced in,” see Vogl (2015, 80– 82).
 3 As the website cheerfully pronounces: “Combining the philosophies behind 
two of Thomas Edison’s greatest inventions— the ticker- tape and the Victrola: 
TickTrola converts stock data to tones so that you can keep your ear on the 
market!” See http://www.geneffects.com/ticktrola/.
 4 A brief history of the media of financial markets is available in Reichert (2009, 
83– 157).
 5 See Lash and Dragos (2016) for a useful interview in which Mirowski outlines 
26 what is at stake in his current project and how it relates to his intellectual work 
so far. See Golumbia (2017) for a preliminary account of Mirowski as a critic of 
the digital.
 6  Here, apart from the history of information theory and neoliberalism, one 
might also wonder how this constitutes another chapter in the forms of non- 
knowledge that digital cultures bring forth. See Bernard et al. (2018).
 7  Schröter suggests elsewhere (Schröter and Heilmann 2016, 20) that this speed- 
up of trade is caused not by computers but is programmed by the escalation of 
the logic of accumulation of capital. We will discuss this below with reference to 
derivatives.
 8  This edited collection of texts on media and Marx already includes a chapter on 
the medium money (Gernalzick 2006). Curiously, Schröter does not reference 
this text, presumably because it rather restrictively (with the help of Schum-
peter) characterizes Marx as a metallist, considers Marx’s theory of value to be 
outdated and in need of abandonment, and summarily dismisses the work of 
Robert Kurz, a key representative of the ”critique of value” stream of Marxian 
thought, as unscientific. As we will see shortly, both the theory of value and the 
work of Kurz are central to Schröter’s arguments here.
 9  Bill Maurer, in his book on technology and the future of money, notes that the 
mobile phone is ”the second- most ubiquitous technology after money” (2015, 
34), which explains why mobile money has become a terrain of experimenta-
tion, as we will discuss below.
10  “Society after Money” is precisely the title of a research project in which 
Jens Schröter is involved alongside sociologists, economists, and commons- 
theorists, among others. See http://nach-dem-geld.de/projekt/.
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The	Ghosts	of	
Hayek	in	Orthodox	
Microeconomics:	
Markets	as	Information	
Processors
Edward Nik- Khah and Philip Mirowski
In media studies, there is recurrent fascination with how commu-
nication, especially when couched in terms of “information,” tends 
to influence many spheres of social life and intellectual endeavor. 
Some of the key figures in that discipline have been especially at-
tentive to the implications for politics of the modern advent of the 
“information economy.” Nevertheless, we think that there has been 
little impetus among media scholars to explore how other disci-
plines, and in this case orthodox economics, have been providing 
competing accounts of the nature and importance of information 
over the same rough time frame. Furthermore, we think they might 
be surprised to learn that Friedrich Hayek and the neoliberals have 
been important in framing inquiry into the information economy 
for the larger culture for a couple of generations. This essay is a 
preliminary report on what would happen to intellectual history 
if media studies took the early development of the “economics of 
information” into account.
32 We devote this chapter to asking what “deep impact” Hayek 
registered on the economics profession. The Austrians, as the 
caretakers of Hayek’s legacy, have tended to subscribe to a unitary 
Hayek account; the economics orthodoxy has claimed there to be 
two Hayeks— one good, one bad. Perhaps this is a bit too crude, 
but we believe that attending more carefully to all the positions 
Hayek took on agent epistemology and information will lead us to 
revise the count upward. When we review the history, it becomes 
apparent that Hayek advanced three distinct views. Significantly, 
each one found its echo in a school of economic thought (the 
Walrasian School, the Bayes- Nash School, and the Experimentalist 
School) and informed a corresponding view on the appropriate 
role for the economist to play in the setup of markets— the most 
important development within microeconomics over the past two 
decades. Contrary to both orthodox economists and Austrians, 
neoliberalism has occupied the profession’s heartland, and has 
planted its flag.
Today, market designers celebrate the market as omnipotent 
information processor while conflating the pervasive ignorance of 
market agents with virtue. Against proposals from certain scholars 
in science and technology studies who promote a “constructivist” 
approach to markets and seek a potential alliance with market 
designers (see Mirowski and Nik- Khah 2008), we offer this account 
of information economics and market design to media studies 
scholars, in order for them to consider both the dangers of equat-
ing the market with the computer as information processor and 
the more serious epistemological challenges these developments 
pose for thinking about the role of human– machine relations in 
society more generally.
Hayek:	The	Good,	the	Bad,	and	the	Unitary
Sometimes it is easy to see the beginnings of things and harder 
to see the ends. During the 1940s, Friedrich Hayek challenged the 
practicality of central economic planning on informational grounds, 
33providing the impetus for an impressive roster of mathematical 
neoclassical economists to join in efforts to rebut him. Some may 
additionally note that it is “interesting” that so many of these 
figures would go on to play leading roles in the various and sundry 
research programs that came to be known as “information eco-
nomics.” Even so, the interest has apparently been fleeting: there 
has been little sober reflection on the full significance of Hayek’s 
role in this episode, and none whatsoever on whether, and in what 
capacity, he reprised it.
Specifically, most economists would think it absurd to even enter-
tain the thought that Hayek’s later work— including not only his 
scholarship but also the establishment of the Mont Pèlerin Society 
(MPS), as well as the subsequent development of neoliberalism— 
was relevant in any way to the historical development of informa-
tion economics. We know this because a few have felt the need 
to state for the record that the MPS and the neoliberalism it has 
espoused has come nowhere near the core of the economics 
orthodoxy. Of course, the very fact that anyone would feel 
compelled to defend economics from this charge is an interesting 
matter in its own right— due in part to the recent appearance of 
scholarship casting professional economists as important players 
in the postwar revival of the Right, the outsized representation of 
MPS members in the roster of Bank of Sweden prizewinners, and 
the sad cooptation of the profession during the Crisis (see Mirowski 
and Nik- Khah 2017). Nevertheless, those who have taken it as their 
business to educate the public on such matters have warranted 
that there is nothing to see here— perhaps in the macroeconomic 
hinterlands, but not where the serious science is done.
Take the 1987 Bank of Sweden prizewinner, Robert Solow. Prompt-
ed by the publication of one recent history of the postwar rise of 
“pro- market” thinking, Solow said the following:
Outside the economics profession, [the MPS] was in-
visible. The MPS was no more influential inside the 
economics profession. There were no publications to be 
34 discussed. The American membership was apparently lim-
ited to economists of the Chicago School and its scattered 
university outposts, plus a few transplanted Europeans. 
“Some of my best friends” belonged. There was, of course, 
continuing research and debate among economists on 
the good and bad properties of competitive and non-
competitive markets, and the capacities and limitations 
of corrective regulation. But these would have gone on in 
the same way had the MPS not existed. (Solow 2012)
Of course, it would be absurd to claim that politics were entirely 
absent from postwar disputes over matters of economic doctrine— 
but to many, such disputes seem quaint, the holdover of a bygone 
era and confined to questionable subsets of the profession. 
Recently, Noah Smith has taken it as his duty and mission to 
challenge the unprecedented enmity directed at the economics 
profession suffusing the blogosphere in the wake of the worldwide 
financial crisis by drawing attention to what he believes to be 
praiseworthy recent developments; not hiding behind impenetra-
ble mathematics and jargon, Smith assumes the responsibility of 
taking his argument directly to the public. The title of a recent post 
of his accurately conveys his central point: “Economists used to be 
the priests of free markets— now they’re just a bunch of engineers” 
(N. Smith 2014b). According to Smith’s understanding of the profes-
sion, most economists are prone to focus on small, solvable prob-
lems, and uninterested in making sweeping contributions to policy:
I have the vague sense that if you were an idealistic, bril-
liant young libertarian in the 1960s and ’70s, you might 
naturally dream of growing up to be an economist. You 
might watch a rousing speech by Milton Friedman, and 
you might imagine that one day you, too, would use the 
power of logic and rationality and mathematics to ward 
off the insanity of socialism. Well, America still has some 
idealistic, brilliant young libertarians, and some of them 
probably still dream of becoming economists. But now 
they will be in the minority. They will be joined by quite a 
35few— maybe more— idealistic brilliant young liberals, who 
recognize the power of markets but also want to figure 
out how to fix things when markets go wrong. And they 
will also be joined by quite a few brilliant engineers, for 
whom political ideals take a back seat to the solving of 
practical, real- world problems. Econ isn’t what it used to 
be. (N. Smith 2014b)
He is willing to grant the point, but only for macroeconomists:
So if you really feel you must get out your rake or pitch-
fork and storm the gates of the economists who fiddled 
while our economy burned, go ahead. Just make sure 
that the people whose heads you are calling for are not 
in that vast silent majority who are working diligently on 
the small but solvable problems of “microeconomics.” The 
people at whom you are angry are called “macroecono-
mists.” (N. Smith 2014a)
While one might rightly lament the susceptibility of macroeco-
nomics to ideological capture, the important point for Smith is 
that microeconomics remains hermetically sealed, protected from 
anything unsavory.
Economists who acknowledge the significance of Hayek’s scholarly 
contributions while denying that of his assiduous political and orga-
nizational efforts face a challenge. Reading the aforementioned 
Solow provides some indication of how the orthodox economist 
manages to meet it:
The Good Hayek was a serious scholar who was partic-
ularly interested in the role of knowledge in the econo-
my . . . All economists know that a system of competitive 
markets is a remarkably efficient way to aggregate all that 
knowledge while preserving decentralization. (Solow 2012)
The “bad” of Hayek is easily and safely excised: Hayek possessed 
“intuition” but little else, whereas the modern economist comes 
equipped with a bracing rigor. Hayek may have posed some 
36 interesting questions, but his lack of mathematical sophistication 
permitted his politics to mar the enterprise. Since then, economists 
have scrubbed away all its traces. Perhaps true, but Solow provides 
us no example of how this worked.
For one such example, we may turn to the 2007 Bank of Sweden 
prizewinner, Eric Maskin:
Hayek had a remarkable intuitive understanding of some 
major propositions in mechanism design— and the as-
sumptions they rest on— long before their precise formu-
lation. Indeed, his understanding seems to have been a 
guiding influence in their formulation. (Maskin 2015, 251)
Maskin’s two “Hayekian” propositions are, first, that “competitive 
markets are informationally efficient” and, second, that “the market 
mechanism is uniquely incentive compatible.” Notwithstanding 
Hayek’s intuition, a firm grasp of formal economic analysis (par-
ticularly game theory) eluded him, preventing him from grasping 
the nettle (“he did not anticipate— as far as I can tell— the Vickrey- 
Clarke- Groves mechanism for determining a Pareto optimal public 
goods allocation” (Maskin 2015, 251)). Nevertheless, Maskin de-
scribes him as “precursor” (247) and “guiding influence” (251) (as if 
these would serve as the same thing), even going so far as to make 
the interesting suggestion that those most involved in developing 
the game theoretic literature on markets did so with Hayek in mind. 
Unfortunately, Maskin never seriously pursued this idea any further: 
probably because he exhibits no more than a bare- bones under-
standing of the corpus of Hayek’s work. Unsurprisingly, both passag-
es Maskin cites in support of his interpretation of Hayek were taken 
from the same article, “The Use of Knowledge in Society”; neither 
says anything about “incentive compatibility”; nor does Maskin feel 
impelled to provide a single specific example of Hayek’s guidance.
While the orthodoxy’s lack of curiosity concerning its history is in 
no way surprising, one might have hoped for better when it came 
to the self- appointed caretakers of Hayek’s legacy, the Austrians. 
But to date, their efforts to address Hayek’s influence on the 
37orthodoxy have proved no more insightful. This was nowhere more 
apparent than in the aftermath of the award of the 2007 Bank 
of Sweden Prize to Leonid Hurwicz, Maskin, and Roger Myerson. 
Hurwicz was a chief Walrasian market socialist; his award cele-
brated his work following a repudiation of his earlier enthusiasms. 
Initially, some Austrians greeted the occasion with applause, as an 
acknowledgement of Hayek’s worth so incontrovertible as to be 
undeniable by even the most blinkered orthodox economist.1 But 
this position apparently ran up against the perceived need to main-
tain the distinctiveness of the Austrian approach, not to mention 
the traditional insistence upon the “articulate” versus “inarticulate” 
knowledge distinction (which was often used precisely to upbraid 
Walrasians such as Hurwicz).2
So, subsequently, some Austrians executed an about- face and 
now accused both Walrasians and Bayes- Nash game theorists 
(such as Maskin and Myerson) alike of “failed appropriation” of 
Hayek (Boettke and O’Donnell 2013). One might expect that this 
turnabout would stimulate an interest in pinpointing exactly what 
it was game theorists sought to appropriate and why.3 To that end, 
some Austrians did organize a conference at George Mason, with 
the laudable intention “to examine and provide us with insights 
into the impact of Hayek’s work on the research direction of other 
scholars in economics and political economy . . . [to] stimulate a 
conversation about the deep impact of Hayek’s ideas” (Boettke 
and Coyne 2015).4 But so far this project was hampered by a 
commitment to a single monolithic “Hayekian framework,” which 
mainstream approaches to the “economics of information,” puta-
tively characterized by a flawed adherence to the “omniscience” of 
economic agents, could be said to have misunderstood. Unfortu-
nately, the ahistoricity of their approach has induced Austrians to 
miss the most direct avenues of Hayek’s “deep impact” on orthodox 
economics.
Perceiving this impact will require us to move beyond the 1940s, 
and to observe how both Hayek and the economics orthodoxy alike 
grappled with epistemic issues over the subsequent half century.
38 Hayek	Changes	His	Mind
We begin by recapping a relatively well- known set of events: Austri-
an neoliberals such as Friedrich Hayek kicked off something known 
as the “Socialist Calculation Controversy” with an argument that 
government planners could never know enough to adequately plan 
any reasonably elaborate economic system. The error of Socialism, 
said Hayek, was to try and accomplish something through planning 
that had already been solved by The Market. Hayek suggested 
that it would be too difficult to collect all the disparate and sundry 
information to engage in economy- wide planning. We cannot 
reprise those events here; all we wish to do is highlight that the 
subsequent disputes tended to get sidetracked into a set of parallel 
considerations of what it meant for markets to convey “informa-
tion” to the relevant actors. By the 1940s, the neoliberal argument 
was largely being promoted by international members of the 
newly founded Mont Pèlerin Society, while their opponents were 
primarily located (contrary to modern impressions) at something 
called the Cowles Commission, located from 1938 to 1952 at the 
University of Chicago, and thereafter at Yale.
What trace remains of this dispute in the mental maps of the 
modal economist is found in Hayek’s “Use of Knowledge in Society,” 
and aptly summarized by that article’s most famous passage:
What is the problem we try to solve when we try to con-
struct a rational economic order? On certain familiar as-
sumptions the answer is simple enough. If we possess all 
the relevant information, if we can start out from a given 
system of preferences and if we command complete 
knowledge of available means, the problem which re-
mains is purely one of logic . . . This, however, is emphat-
ically not the economic problem which society faces . . . 
The peculiar character of the problem of a rational eco-
nomic order is determined precisely by the fact that the 
knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make 
use never exists in concentrated or integrated form but 
39solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently 
contradictory knowledge which all the separate individu-
als possess. The economic problem of society is thus not 
merely a problem how to allocate “given” resources . . . it 
is a problem of the utilization of knowledge which is not 
given to anyone in its totality. (Hayek 1945, 519- 20)
The typical attitude toward this passage is exemplified by Maskin 
(quoted above): it is right and proper that the Bank of Sweden 
honored him. But 1945 was a long time ago, and the memory of 
socialism recedes further with every day. Goodbye to all that.
Only recently, with the explosion of historical literature on Hayek, 
have we begun to encounter serious scholarly work on Hayek’s 
struggles with epistemology.5 As with almost every other major 
intellectual figure, Hayek changed his position on key theoretical 
terms over the course of his career; and none was more conse-
quential than his treatment of knowledge. Interestingly, in Hayek’s 
last book, The Fatal Conceit, he admits,
I confess that it took me too a long time from my first 
breakthrough, in my essay on “Economics and Knowl-
edge” through the recognition of “Competition as a 
Discovery Procedure” and my essay on “The Pretense of 
Knowledge” to state my theory of the dispersal of infor-
mation, from which follows my conclusions about the 
superiority of spontaneous formations to central direc-
tion. (Hayek 1988, 88)
So while we have his frank admission that his system did not 
congeal around the concept of information until rather late in his 
career, at least in his own mind, we do not have a corresponding 
historical schematic of how it changed from his own hand. Leaning 
on the secondary literature, we will proceed to summarize it as a 
symphony in three movements.
In the first movement, Hayek displaced the rather cryptic position 
of Ludwig von Mises in the Socialist Calculation controversy, that 
40 all “calculation” whatsoever would be impossible under socialism, 
and replaced it with the seemingly more credible proposition that 
it would be impossible to collate and deploy all the knowledge 
required to coordinate the economy as successfully as the market 
managed to do in practice. In other words, he transformed 
what Mises had portrayed as a breakdown of (Max) Weberian 
zweckrationality under socialism into something initially far less 
threatening, a species of epistemological difficulty endemic under 
socialism.6 For the early Hayek, knowledge was “dispersed” in such 
a way that bringing it all together in a central planning authority 
would be difficult— but, note well, not impossible. There seemed to 
be a special kind of slippery knowledge, a sticky goo qualitatively 
different from more conventional scientific conceptions, that was 
local, characterized by special conditions of time and place.
It was almost as if this species of knowledge was something 
entropic : an energy that grew too diffuse to be readily gathered 
up and consolidated into a useful form.7 Not all knowledge shared 
this character, said Hayek; but the mere fact it existed at all was 
a club he could use to beat on the Langes and Marschaks of this 
world. Sometimes Hayek hinted that the dispersed character had 
something to do with subjective experience, but at this stage he 
steered well clear of issues of cognitive capacities or capacities to 
articulate this knowledge to others. In this movement, there was 
very little in the way of actual epistemology or formal psychology 
standing behind the concept. Instead, in his famous paper “Use of 
Knowledge in Society” (1945), he proposes to reconceive the mar-
ket as a “mechanism for communicating information.” Perhaps this 
is one reason it seemed to appeal to some neoclassical economists, 
who were more readily inclined to interpret knowledge of this ilk as 
a “thing” scattered about the landscape, rather like pixie dust too 
fine to pick up. Indeed, most of the favorable citations of Hayek by 
neoclassical economists date from this period.
The next movement in Hayek’s Surprise Symphony happened 
sometime around his own return to psychology published in 1952 
as The Sensory Order. At this stage, Hayek entertained the notion 
41that much of human knowledge is not only inarticulable but also 
tacit and inaccessible to self- examination. Much of his revised 
attitudes concerning knowledge seems to have occurred during 
his stint at the Committee on Social Thought at the University of 
Chicago. In brief, Hayek there sought to revive the old discredited 
associationist psychology of the late eighteenth and early nine-
teenth century, by suggesting mind was little more than sets of 
hierarchies of systems of classifier algorithms that were opaque 
to the thinker.8 He also had been in contact with Michael Polanyi 
at the early MPS meetings and had come across Gilbert Ryle’s 
distinction between “knowing how” and “knowing that” in Ryle’s 
Concept of Mind (1949). He began to explore variations on “tacit” or 
nonarticulable knowledge, not so much by explicitly following Po-
lanyi or Ryle on this topic as through building his own idiosyncratic 
theory of mind upon a foundation of classifier systems about which 
the subject was not even aware of knowing but regularly made use 
of in order to interact with the environment.9
From this point forward, Hayek began to play fast and loose with 
the concept of consciousness, inverting the then- popular Freudian 
frame tale that the unconscious was a soup of barely accessible 
urges upon which rested a fragile vessel of rational thought; for 
Hayek, it was rationality that was largely unconscious, with conscious 
perception and drives constituting the thin veneer of intentionality 
and desires floating on top of the sea of obscure and inaccessible 
rule structures. Thus the types of knowledge that mattered most 
were inarticulate and largely inaccessible to the thinking agent. 
It was also precisely at this juncture that Hayek began making 
explicit references to evolutionary theory as the basis of his entire 
philosophy. The reason behind this shift was that Hayek sought 
to propound that the individual mind did not actually choose the 
rules that worked the best: that was done either through a sort of 
quasi- evolutionary selection of life success at the individual level 
reinforcing the relevant classifier rules or, more frequently, natural 
selection weeding out the individuals with unfit rules in favor of 
those individuals lucky enough to come previously equipped with 
42 superior classifiers. It was, not to mince words, a harsh version of 
social Darwinism.
It is important to understand how this refracted the very notion 
of radical ignorance as a natural state of being for mankind in the 
later political economy of Hayek.10 In this conception, the process 
of coming- to- know became largely disengaged from the knower, 
with most of the action happening at the subconscious level. As 
he wrote in his “Primacy of the Abstract,” “the formation of a new 
abstraction seems never to be the outcome of a conscious process, 
not something at which the mind can deliberately aim, but always 
a discovery of something which already guides its operation” (1978, 
46). Here, the celebrated philosopher of freedom postulated a 
grim species of predestination that would make even Calvin blush. 
The political implication was clear: if an individual mind could not 
even reliably plan or organize its own pathway of learning through 
life, it would exhibit contemptible hubris to think it could ever plan 
the lives of others, much less a whole economy. Knowledge here 
was no longer like entropy, or pixie dust; now it resembled a great 
submerged iceberg, nine- tenths invisible, and frozen into place 
aeons ago, with only minor changes around the margins when it 
jostled up against other similar icebergs.
How did these lumbering monads ever manage to communicate, 
much less live in societies that displayed any reliable level of 
organization? That question was finally answered in the third 
movement of Hayek’s Surprise Symphony. Strangely for a doctrine 
that started out so concerned over respect for the inviolate individ-
ual and his or her subjectivity, the late Hayek rendered his system 
internally coherent by admitting that knowledge did not really 
persist in the level of the individual mind, for the most part, but 
was processed and invested with meaning at the suprapersonal 
level. In a catchphrase, since so much that people actually knew 
was inaccessible to them, the only entity that really was capable of 
judging and validating human knowledge was The Market. The key 
turning point, as Hayek informs us in The Fatal Conceit, was his 1968 
essay “Competition as a Discovery Procedure”:
43[Epistemology is governed by] competition as a proce-
dure for the discovery of such facts as, without resort 
to it, would not be known to anyone . . . The knowledge of 
which I speak consists rather of a capacity to find out the 
particular circumstances, which becomes effective only if 
the possessors of this knowledge are informed by the market 
which kinds of things or services are wanted, and how 
urgently they are wanted . . . Knowledge that is used [in a 
market] is that of all its members. Ends that it serves are 
the separate ends of those individuals, in all their variety 
and contrariness. (1978, 179, 182– 83; emphasis added)
No longer was knowledge being treated as an elusive thing by 
Hayek, scattered about in an inconvenient matter, because in this 
version not only is much human knowledge unable to be retrieved 
from within by the individual in question but, indeed, there exists 
a species of knowledge not “known” by any individual human being at 
all. Here we are cosseted in the realm of Donald Rumsfeld’s infa-
mous “unknown unknowns.”11
Now what is the message there? The message is that 
there are no “knowns.” There are things we know that we 
know. There are known unknowns. That is to say there 
are things that we now know we don’t know. But there 
are also unknown unknowns. There are things we don’t 
know we don’t know. So when we do the best we can and 
we pull all this information together, and we then say 
well that’s basically what we see as the situation, that is 
really only the known knowns and the known unknowns. 
(Rumsfeld 2010)
The only recourse of the rational individual in this subpar situation  
is primarily to acquiesce in the dictates of signals conveyed by The  
Market, which hint at deeper truths than most humans will ever 
know.
But what is this depersonalized and deracinated suprahuman 
knowledge but a new virtual kind of information? This, we think, 
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the term “knowledge” with “information” in his last work, Fatal 
Conceit. Sometimes, when it came to this ectoplasmic information, 
the late Hayek lapsed into his scientistic mode, where evolution 
had winnowed the elusive truth out of human frailty; but other 
times, he reverted to full religious mystery: “spontaneous order . . . 
cannot be properly said to have a purpose . . . known to any single 
person, or relatively small group of persons” (1978, 183). Some 
latter- day Austrians have argued that entrepreneurs are just 
“smarter” than any dedicated intellectual, since they are marinated 
in this information and thus quicker to respond to market signals.12 
Almost by definition, there is no instrument available to mankind to 
“test” this proposition. As with all the great world religions, the sole 
and final terminus for the skeptic was to surrender to Faith: The 
Market as Super Information Processor knows more than we could 
ever begin to divine.
One might aver that this is an egregiously idiosyncratic trajectory, 
the ruinous road to the conflation of pervasive ignorance with vir-
tue, something that would never ever be followed by any prudent 
rational- choice orthodoxy in economics, nor indeed, any scientific 
thinker whatsoever.13 The modern economist often claims to like 
the early Hayek but thinks he or she tends to studiously avoid the 
later Hayek. We beg to disagree: the historical record is far richer 
than that.
Orthodox	Epistemologies
Nowadays, one can still find economists that maintain at least 
some vague awareness that the origins of present- day microeco-
nomics had something to do with Cold War politics— though exactly 
what may elude them. In discussing the history of the highly influ-
ential National Science Foundation / Conference on Econometrics 
and Mathematical Economics (NSF/CEME) Decentralization Series,14 
the Stanford economist (and former series director) Matthew Jack-
son (2006) said:
45My impression is that the word decentralization [in the 
title of the conference] reflects the fact that the starting 
point in many of the problems addressed by the series is 
that the necessary information starts in a decentralized 
state . . . I think that perhaps the history of the conference 
reflects the fact that these systems were viewed as alter-
natives to centralized or planned economies when the 
conference series was first funded, during the cold war.
To fill in a few pertinent details: in the 1950s, economists at 
Cowles had interpreted Hayek as arguing the relative merit of “free 
markets” over socialism on informational grounds, and found this 
argument wanting. In a move that would have vast and enduring 
ramifications for the future of the economics profession, Leonid 
Hurwicz and an impressive roster of his colleagues at Cowles 
responded to Hayek’s provocations by reconceiving their own task 
as external evaluation of the informational properties of economic 
systems, as if from some great height, claiming soon thereafter 
that these methods could also inform choice among a plethora of 
“institutions.”15 Consequently, the Cowlesmen eventually rebrand-
ed themselves as experts in “organization,” a term that assumed 
brash capacious dimensions so as to cover such varied phenomena 
as the internal structuring of large firms, the design of cost- plus 
contracts for the mobilization of industry during wartime, the 
evaluation of Soviet central- planning algorithms, and the crafting of 
commercial regulation.
Indeed, the historian Hunter Heyck has described how a fascination 
with “organization” became conflated with themes of algorithmic 
reason and analysis of information across the immediate postwar 
social sciences.16 With increasing frequency, these self- identified 
organization theorists (disproportionately concentrated at Purdue, 
Caltech, Arizona, and Northwestern in the 1970s) began to 
contemplate designing new institutions, ranging from novel legal 
regimes to “solutions” for public goods provision to the reorganiza-
tion of entire economies.17 And in what turned out to be the most 
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they would eventually also claim an ability to reconstruct individual 
precursor markets themselves. The Cowles pretensions to evaluate 
organizations in general thus paved the way to what eventually 
became known within economics as “market design.”
What followed was a massive upheaval in the practice of econom-
ics. Since roughly 1980, the profession converged upon a more 
“constructivist” approach to markets. Where economists once 
placidly contemplated markets from without, situated in a space 
detached from their subject matter, so to speak, instead now they 
are much less disciplined about their doctrines concerning the 
nature of economic agency, and much more inclined to be found 
down in the trenches with other participants, engaged in making 
markets.
It can be difficult for the outsider to perceive just how radically 
transformative this turn was, due in no small part to some 
economists’ penchant to maintain a public impression of continuity 
with their previous activities. In an article for the New York Times, 
Hal Varian (2002) notes economists’ participation in the design 
of an increasingly wide variety of institutions, ranging from the 
provision of electricity, to the assignment of medical residencies, to 
financial exchanges. Although the title of Varian’s article (“Avoiding 
the Pitfalls When Economics Shifts from Science to Engineering”) 
may suggest to the reader a periodization, it is truer to the spirit 
of the article to interpret “shift” as “application,” something that 
characterizes all science— similarly, engineers apply ideas from 
physics to design bridges. In Varian’s telling, someone such as Karl 
Marx is reinterpreted as an “economic engineer” (“Karl Marx . . . 
also had ideas about economic design that ended disastrously”), 
which tends to have the effect of diminishing the novelty of recent 
developments in economics.18
But every once and again, some economist will reflect on just how 
much has changed. Mark Thoma, the well- known author of the 
blog Economist’s View, stated:
47Today I was thinking about the fact that I mainly got into 
economics to understand how the world works, not to do 
policy or try to use the tools of economics to recommend 
how to change economic institutions, though economic 
policy was certainly of interest too. But mostly I just 
wanted to understand it all, like a kid taking apart a toy 
to figure out how it works. I was particularly interested 
in understanding how money functions and what effect 
changes in the money supply would have on the econo-
my. I have no idea why economics interests me so much, 
but it does.
But once I got here, I realized the demand was not just 
to explain what we know and to be honest about what we 
don’t. People want to know how to make economic insti-
tutions function better and they turn to economists to tell 
them how to accomplish that task. (2006)
The only provision we might make here is that most would view the 
adjective “economic” as redundant. Over the past two decades, arti-
cles in major economics journals appeared proclaiming the advent 
of “engineering economics,” “market design,” “auction theory for 
privatization,” and the like.
For the present purposes, we take for granted the significance 
of this development, and pose the question: What, if anything, 
about design is related to Hayek? One obvious answer is that 
market design shares with Hayek the view that markets don’t 
exist to allocate given physical resources so much as they serve to 
integrate and disseminate something called “knowledge.” Another 
would attribute to Hayek the very idea that an economy can be 
“designed”: Hayek sought to study the institutional foundations 
of the “competitive order,” as a prelude to constructing an ideal 
competitive order. Both answers are true enough, but woefully 
incomplete. Additionally, we wish to insist that Hayek’s work on 
epistemology has left traces on the substantive features of the two 
dominant approaches to the economics of market design, which 
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for reasons we will elaborate on presently.
The	Bayes-	Nash	School	of	Design
This historical origin of this school is located in the work of William 
Vickrey of Columbia University, winner of the 1994 Bank of Sweden 
Prize and the namesake of the “Vickrey auction.” In a 1960 study, 
Vickrey noted the “strategic misrepresentation of preferences” 
might prevent the government from gathering information to con-
struct a social welfare function (Vickrey 1960, 517– 19). A year later, 
he raised a similar concern with the market socialist proposal of 
Abba Lerner (Vickrey 1961). In his Economics of Control, Lerner had 
proposed a “counterspeculation” method, to be used by a central 
board to counteract monopolists’ (and monopsonists’) price- setting 
power by estimating and guaranteeing a competitive equilibrium 
price. In other words, Lerner’s analysis had suggested to Vickrey 
that active efforts might be required to gather diffuse information 
together in one place. In both papers, Vickrey had expressed 
a novel concern: economists who had hoped to assist the gov-
ernment in gathering dispersed information would encounter a 
problem. This problem was, in a word, mendacity: those holding the 
crucial information had the capacity to distort it, and for strategic 
reasons might be expected to do so.
Vickrey responded to this new problem in a way that will by now 
seem commonplace to the student of economics: he explored 
the incentive properties of four auction types— the first price and 
second price sealed bid, the English, and the Dutch auctions— and 
used Nash game theory to do so. From today’s vantage point, it is 
tempting to become excessively fascinated by Vickrey’s appeal to 
game theory as a generic logic of strategic choice, and consequent-
ly to ignore the most significant features of Vickrey’s work. For 
Vickrey’s version of epistemology, it was no longer possible to hold 
tight to one’s private information— so long as the analyst crafted a 
method to get in your head to pry the information out of there.19 
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compatible” auctions. We know that this idea would eventually be 
greeted with much fanfare, but at the time pretty much everyone 
ignored Vickrey’s use of game theory; even Vickrey would downplay 
its significance, as “one of my digressions into abstract econom-
ics, at best of minor significance in terms of human welfare” 
(Dreze 1998).
It would be left to other scholars sharing Cowles’s enthusiasms 
to make the most significant developments along these lines. The 
key figure here was Robert Wilson of Stanford’s Graduate School 
of Business who, although not formally affiliated with Cowles or 
RAND, came to share many of their enthusiasms.20 Wilson’s Stan-
ford department became the first institution devoted to the study 
of modeling Bayesian actors interacting in markets; along with 
his students Armando Ortega Reichert, Paul Milgrom, and Peter 
Cramton, Wilson would form what we call the Bayes- Nash School of 
Design.21 The operations researcher Michael Rothkopf was one of 
the few close observers to put his finger on the true significance of 
Wilson’s innovation:
Quite recently publications have begun to appear that 
indicate that operations researchers are starting to con-
struct bidding models that are realistic and that consider 
simultaneously the optimality of the decisions of all bid-
ders. The new factor taken into consideration in these 
models is the uncertainty faced by the bidders as to the 
value of the subject of the auction. In most of this work, 
the uncertainty of each bidder is restricted to the value of 
the subject of the auction to his competitors. Only Wilson 
has begun to take account of the uncertainty of a bidder 
about the value of the subject of the auction to himself. 
(Rothkopf 1969, 362)
Agents no longer knew their values— their knowledge could now be 
wrong, and much in need of correction. Economists of the Bayes- 
Nash tradition would generously offer to help them out.
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game. This school portrays all bidders as viewing the auction 
game in the same way— the structure of the game is purportedly 
“common knowledge.” Bidding against other bidders immediately 
raised the specter of having to take competing bidders’ beliefs 
into account, and therefore the complexity of dealing with “beliefs 
about beliefs.” The complex hierarchies of “beliefs about beliefs” 
are collapsed into a single statistic, dubbed a “type.” Initially, I am 
presumed to know only my own “type,” and will assume that I 
am the same as my opponents (i.e., we are the same “types”). As 
information is released over the course of the auction, I come to 
appreciate how my opponents differ from myself. This appreciation 
matters not only for strategic reasons but also for epistemic rea-
sons: because the roster of types is presumed to be stochastically 
distributed around a true- valued mean, it is only by participating in 
an auction that I come to know my own value. How this works can 
best be understood by considering a typical model of an “English 
Auction” conducted for a single item for sale.
In an English Auction, the price of the item for sale starts out low 
and rises until all bidders drop out save one. The lone bidder 
remaining “wins” the item, and pays an amount equal to the price 
prevailing at the time the second- to- last bidder dropped out. 
According to the Bayes- Nash approach, bidders should use the 
information released by their competitors dropping out of the 
auction to reconsider and recalibrate their own valuations, and 
should continue to bid so long as the expected value of winning 
the auction conditional upon all remaining bidders dropping out is 
greater than or equal to the price of the good.22
Significantly, the informational claims of Hayek were also foremost 
in the consideration of members of the Bayes- Nash School of 
Design. Consider Wilson:
A half- century ago, Friedrich von Hayek offered a new 
perspective on markets, prices, and the invisible hand. In 
his view, the fundamental process of a market economy 
51is price formation. He interprets prices resulting from 
competing bids and offers as summaries of information 
dispersed among traders . . . A quarter-century later, the 
developers of the Economics of Information discovered 
that market imperfections attributable to informational 
asymmetries can cause serious inefficiencies . . . Initially, 
the main analytical tool was price theory, but more re-
cently it has been game theory. In particular, it is the fla-
vor of game theory that originates in the work of . . . John 
Harsanyi. (Wilson 1996, 296)
And, in a survey article on the Bayes- Nash School, consider the 
more specific reference linking a result of the school to the work 
of Hayek:
It is often pointed out (for example, by Hayek [in “The Use 
of Knowledge in Society”]) that one of the remarkable 
and important features of the price system is its ability to 
convey information efficiently. All that a buyer or a seller 
needs to know about a commodity’s supply or demand is 
summarized by a single number, its price. Does the pro-
cess of price formation by competitive bidding have such 
information efficiencies? In the common- value model, the 
bidders lack complete information about the item’s true 
value; each bidder has different partial information. How-
ever, even though no single bidder has perfect informa-
tion, it can be shown that, if there is perfect competition 
in the bidding, the selling price reflects all of the bidders’ 
private information . . . Thus the selling price conveys in-
formation about the item’s true value. With perfect com-
petition, the price is equal to the true value even though 
no individual in the economy knows what this true value 
is and no communication among the bidders takes place. 
(McAfee and McMillan 1987, 721– 22)
Note well that these leading members of the Bayes- Nash School 
made reference to the work of Hayek in the context of interpreting 
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portrayed as difficult to access by the auctioneer/central planner; 
but it was also difficult for the agents themselves to access: in 
contrast to the conventional Walrasian view, agents’ knowledge 
was untrustworthy. But while agents’ knowledge was deemed 
untrustworthy, they were still able to incorporate more information 
into their valuations, and therefore were deemed capable of highly 
sophisticated reasoning. The market would provide the information 
needed to carry out such sophisticated reasoning.
Now, markets could be enlisted to help agents think. “Truth” was 
now located both “out there” and “in here”— at least once the mar-
ket had done its work. Truth was “out there” in that the market was 
designed in such a way that the price of an appropriately designed 
auction equaled the putative objective monetary value of an item 
for sale; it was “in here” in that bidders were sophisticated enough 
to infer this value from the “signals” conveyed by other bidders 
during the auction process, avoiding any behavior they would later 
regret, at least in equilibrium.
The	Experimentalist	School	of	Design
Let us first acknowledge the obvious: claiming that experimental 
economics constitutes a distinct school of market design is likely 
to strike some contemporaries as rather odd. After all, isn’t exper-
imentation about making economics more scientific by subjecting 
theoretical claims to controlled testing? But experimentalists have 
harbored far more vaunting ambitions. One gets a sense of these 
ambitions by examining the backgrounds of Vernon Smith, Charles 
Plott, Stephen Rassenti, Robert Bulfin, and Alvin Roth. The first 
thing to notice about this crew is that they did not trace their ge-
nealogy out of some well- established social scientific experimental 
tradition, such as that found in psychology, but instead hailed from 
engineering and operations research. In light of this background, 
it begins to make sense that such figures would also occupy 
themselves with problems of economic design. And then there are 
additional reasons.
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work of the Walrasian mechanism designers, the development in 
engineering departments of optimization routines, the develop-
ment within economic laboratories of computerized experimental 
methods, and the neoliberal field of “public choice.” The first 
contribution of experimentalists to attract the rapt attention of 
the orthodoxy (perhaps we should call it experimental economics’ 
“killer app”) was not the testing of economic theory, but instead 
the development and deployment of novel market forms to 
displace bureaucratic decision making. Under the new regime, the 
market, including its rules and participants, would now be explicitly 
conceived as a “person- machine system,” a hybrid computational 
device.23
Experimentalists nowadays proclaim that everywhere, from the 
trading pit to the regulator’s office to the corporate boardroom, 
can benefit from a little “economic system design.”24 In one respect, 
the first adjective is a bit of a misnomer, or at least imprecise, since 
for modern experimentalists there is no delimited “economy” that 
serves to circumscribe their attentions; hence, for the Experimen-
talist School, unlike in the cases of our previous schools, there 
can be no canonical model of the economy. There is, however, a 
generic “set packing problem” that results in complications that 
must be addressed in order to successfully design an economic 
system. The distinctive mathematical feature of this maximization 
problem is that because bids for packages are permitted, solving 
the maximization problem involves properly assigning prices to 
disjoint sets of items.
One feature of this approach is an intensified and more sophisti-
cated focus on the algorithmic properties of the market than pre-
viously available.25 When stressing the computational properties of 
market operations, these market designers appeal to the “compu-
tational efficiency” of algorithms. When focusing on the algorithmic 
properties of markets, this approach recommends substituting less 
computationally burdensome procedures, often by shifting part— 
though not very much— of the computational burden onto the 
54 “human persons” (bidders, in the case of markets) to assist in the 
search process (Porter et al. 2003, 11154). Markets, once conflated 
with the act of exchange, are now credited with being able to solve 
immensely complex maximization problems of any provenance. 
The relative status of humans versus “mechanisms” in this process 
becomes inverted in the quest to overcome complexity.
Although they did talk about offloading some of the computational 
burden onto agents, market designers did not view the “person” 
part of this “person- machine system” with much in the way of 
cognitive capacity. Perhaps some of this attitude derived from the 
experience of manipulating students in experimental settings. The 
dreaded hive mind of collective consciousness had finally made its 
appearance in economics. Agents are shape- shifters; sometimes 
viewed as incapable of coping with the substantial computational 
requirements imposed on them by Bayesian inference; in some 
other cases they can’t think at all. People may be smart, stupid, or 
anywhere in between in the New New Economics. But prudence 
dictates it is best to assume the worst, and to ensure that the 
performance of markets is robust to the cognitive capacities 
of agents, or lack thereof. Such robustness is accomplished by 
offloading most of the task of information processing entirely 
onto the market mechanisms. The economist’s task is now to build 
markets to handle the cognition that agents cannot— or, to use 
the highly appropriate term favored by experimentalists, to build 
“smart markets.”
Experimentalists also framed their interventions by referring to the 
ideas of Hayek. One observes such framing in experimentalists’ 
activities in making smart markets:
The objective is to combine the information advantages 
of decentralized ownership with the coordination advan-
tages of central processing . . . In effect we offer a solution 
to the Lange- Lerner- Hayek controversy of the 1930s. (V. 
Smith 1991, 811)
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processing” is paramount. Central processing enables the comple-
tion of trades too complicated for individuals to complete on their 
own: “There is a puzzle as to the processes whereby our brains 
have [market exchange] and other skills so deeply hidden from our 
calculating self- aware minds” (V. Smith 2010, 5). At the hands of the 
Experimentalist School, the market is redescribed as a “price dis-
covery” process, in almost direct parallel to Hayek’s late discussion 
of competition as a discovery process. For example, Charles Plott 
titled the second volume of his collected papers Market Institutions 
and Price Discovery and characterized the lessons emerging from 
the work comprising a substantial part of the volume as follows:
It is focused on the mysterious process through which 
markets find price. From Vernon Smith’s early discovery 
of the ability of the law of supply and demand to predict 
price, the mechanism that produces the market price has 
been a mystery. In many senses the market operates like 
a set of computers, operating in parallel to compute the 
equilibrium price, which is unknown to everyone in the 
market before the market produces the answer. In this 
sense, the concept of “price discovery” as it is used in the 
work of market- makers is appropriate. (Plott 2001, xxiv)
The change in language reflects the Experimentalist view that 
only skillfully designed markets— “smart markets”— can find the 
economic knowledge that cognitively limited agents are incapable 
of knowing. This view is highly compatible with the notion that 
markets have the power to know things that agents cannot, the 
position taken by Hayek during his third period:
In a 1968 lecture, “Competition as a Discovery Proce-
dure,” Hayek says “. . . I propose to consider competition 
as a procedure for the discovery of such facts as . . . 
(otherwise) would not be known to anyone . . .” Great 
insight; experiments have long demonstrated Hayek’s 
56 proposition. People discover a price that they didn’t know 
existed. (V. Smith 2015, 242)
And in direct reference to the ability of skillfully defined markets to 
substitute for human cognition:
Human interactive experiments governed by a comput-
er network enabled the accommodation of far larger 
message spaces, opened the way to the application of 
coordination and optimization algorithms to the mes-
sages of subjects, and facilitated their capacity to reach 
sophisticated equilibrium outcomes they did not need to 
understand. (V. Smith 2006, xii)
Economic designers had managed to convince themselves that 
they had faithfully come to grips with Hayek’s concerns.26 The 
early Cowles- based designers viewed themselves as assisting the 
government in a number of areas— proposing planning rules and 
suggesting the information to gather. Agents knew their “private” 
information, but the government did not. This established for them 
the task of “rational design of the institutional framework,” which 
would amount to a novel kind of economic- cum- communication 
system— not central planning, but not quite like the market, either. 
Initially, economists conceived themselves as designing various 
methods to help gather information; knowledge was held by 
dispersed agents, and the job of the economic designer was to 
figure out how best to transport knowledge from where it was to 
where it wasn’t— lest the economy not operate properly. Designers 
of the Bayes- Nash School tasked themselves with helping agents 
to come to know their own values. This they would do by helping 
agents to correctly infer values, then by recommending the use 
of knowledge- enhancing auction forms. In an environment where 
economists increasingly found themselves selling their expertise, 
such ambitions carried considerable appeal. Although game theo-
rists attributed immensely impressive prodigious rationality to the 
agent, nevertheless economists managed to carve out a special 
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viewed the task of designers as constructing machines to discover 
knowledge that individuals could not discover or otherwise com-
prehend themselves. These “smart markets” would include people, 
but in practice would substitute for the judgment of people— for 
example, by replacing regulatory bureaucracies. The Ghost of 
Hayek haunted them all.
Organizational	Possibilities	for	 
Our	Grandchildren
Over the past twenty years, economists of all stripes have found 
themselves engaged in the provision of boutique markets, de-
ployed for a variety of purposes.27 The economist is now just an 
engineer, as Noah Smith put it, and engineers qua engineers don’t 
do politics: they just want the bridge to hold. Of course, Vernon 
Smith and Charles Plott make for uncomfortable counterexamples 
to this position, given that they are card- carrying MPS members 
and wear their politics on their sleeves. But for economists who 
herald the engineering turn, neither Smith nor Plott is the first one 
to come to mind.28
That nonideological personage would be 2012 Bank of Sweden 
prizewinner Alvin Roth. Roth’s renown comes not merely or even 
primarily from exercises in theorem proving, or in devising a set of 
protocols for subjecting some proposition to a controlled empirical 
test (though he certainly has done both). Instead, to quote the Bank 
of Sweden’s press release upon the announcement of his prize, his 
recognition comes from “the practice of market design,” including 
the development of “systems for matching doctors with hospitals, 
school pupils with schools, and organ donors with patients” (Nobel 
Media AB 2014). To the public, Roth is often held out as the exem-
plary new model economist: the most visible face of a profession 
that leverages expertise not to advance an ideology, but to engineer 
ingenious practical solutions to difficult and important problems.
58 Because these solutions must actually work in the real world, ideo-
logues need not apply. In a blog post entitled “Not all economists 
are neoliberal, honest,” Diane Coyle voices this attitude perfectly:
Where it is appropriate to prioritize efficiency, or to use 
market processes to achieve either efficiency or other 
outcomes, should always be a matter of public and po-
litical debate. Most of the economists I hang out with— 
applied micro people— think it will depend on both peo-
ple’s political choices and on the exact circumstances: the 
US trade in S02 emissions works well, the EU market in 
carbon emissions does not; Alvin Roth’s matching markets 
for kidneys or medical jobs are magical (and no money 
changes hands). My kind of economists tend to be prag-
matists, unlike those in politics who argue the market is 
always best. (Coyle 2015)29
Recent years have seen the term “freshwater versus saltwater” 
recycled for public use, yet no one would think to suggest that 
Roth belonged to either camp: upon his receipt of the Bank of 
Sweden Prize, “freshwater” and “saltwater” alike heaped praise on 
Roth’s work (see, for example, Levitt 2012). Among the Micro, Roth 
assumed a nearly unparalleled stature: after posing the question 
“What is market design?” one well- respected game theorist quipped 
(only partly in jest), “Whatever Alvin Roth says it is” (Vohra 2014). If 
ever there were a person who could wrest market design from the 
“bad Hayek,” it would be Roth.
All of which makes Roth’s discussions of Hayek so noteworthy. 
In his much- lauded post- prize book- length popularization of his 
work, Who Gets What— and Why, Roth links market design to Hayek 
in the following way:
I made the analogy between a free market with effective 
rules and a wheel that can rotate freely because it has an 
axle and well- oiled bearings. I could have been paraphras-
ing the iconic free- market economist Friedrich Hayek . . . 
He understood that markets need effective rules to work 
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economists to help in understanding how to design mar-
kets . . . Debates about markets often use the phrase “free 
markets” as a slogan, sometimes as if markets work best 
without any rules other than property rights. Hayek had 
something to say about that, too: “Probably nothing has 
done so much harm to the liberal cause as the wooden in-
sistence of some liberals on certain rules of thumb, above 
all the principle of laissez faire.” (Roth 2015, 226– 27)
We take this passage not as some smoking- gun evidence that Roth 
intended to set out to craft a high- tech Hayekianism, but rather as 
providing some indication of how pervasive neoliberal ideas are. 
From these words, one can almost sense Roth’s surprise upon pick-
ing up Hayek for the first time and finding so much of what he said 
to be so amenable to his own views: Hayek was opposed to laissez 
faire, held that markets are constructed entities, and that careful 
attention must be paid to institutional structure. So, too, for Roth.30
The reader might well think of Roth’s words here as indicative of 
nothing more than a recognition in Hayek’s work of constructivist 
and informational themes, with none of the attendant epistemolo-
gy, or certainly his politics. It is, after all, a good distance between 
the design of a clearinghouse for medical residents and, say, articu-
lating a rationale for authoritarian liberalism or, more to the point, 
designing a constitution. Hence, we are fortunate that Alvin Roth 
has also speculated in print on a variety of political and economic 
matters— the occasion for which was his participation in a volume 
wherein “leading economists” were asked to speculate on what the 
world will look like in 100 years (Palacios- Huerta 2014). While the 
recent performance of the economics profession should inspire no 
confidence whatsoever in the predictions of its members, closely 
reading Roth’s fantasies can give insight into the state of economics 
today.
At first glance, Roth’s essay might strike one as the musings of an 
engineer who is optimistic in his estimation of humanity’s ability 
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reserves for economists in providing the answers. Indeed, Roth 
favorably quotes Keynes’s famous passage from “Economic Pos-
sibilities for Our Grandchildren,” wherein Keynes counseled that 
economists accept this kind of role: “If economists could manage to 
get themselves thought of as humble, competent people, on a level 
with dentists, that would be splendid!” Roth then adds, “Perhaps 
if we replace dentists with engineers, that is still a good goal for the 
next hundred years” (Roth 2014, 119). And yet, Roth’s engineer- 
economist is entrusted with far more than routine cleanings, filling 
cavities, or the occasional root canal. According to Roth:
As computers and computer science continue to advance, 
artificial intelligence will have crossed the barrier so that 
some parts of technology will be self- directing— able to 
operate not merely without direct human supervision but 
able to formulate intermediate goals as well as plans of 
action to achieve them . . . As computer assistance be-
comes more ubiquitous in all aspects of life, some of that 
assistance will be in markets, helping us piece together 
things we need . . . without the time- consuming personal 
attention that some person would have to give to the 
task. (Roth 2014, 117)
No longer will the market necessarily give people what they say 
they want— instead it is designed to operate regardless of their 
wants. An ever- increasing amount of thinking will be offloaded 
onto smart markets, which will then be commodified and sold. 
Some of market design will be deskilled, but no matter because the 
unbounded scope of “design economics” will offer inexhaustible 
opportunities for the economist- engineer. According to Roth:
Computerized markets will make market design more 
important, as many market details will have to be embod-
ied in computer code. But many kinds of market design 
that are today crafted by specialists will have passed from 
frontier knowledge to whatever is then the equivalent of 
61shrink- wrapped software, much the way that techniques 
of mathematical optimization that once were the domain 
of PhDs in operations research have become available in 
software packages. But there will still be unsolved prob-
lems of organization and coordination, so market design 
(or, more generally, design economics dealing not just 
with markets but with the design of all forms of organiz-
ing, transacting, and allocating) will have become and 
will remain an important part of economics. (Roth 2014, 
117– 18)
But the future is now. As we noted in the previous section, econ-
omists, beginning with those at Cowles but rapidly spreading 
outward, have styled themselves as experts in the design of 
organizations for at least four decades. And, indeed, returning to 
Who Gets What, Roth offers the following present account of market 
design: “Successful designs depend greatly on the details of the 
market, including the culture and psychology of the participants” 
(Roth 2015, 78). And, more specifically, “if you really want to oper-
ate at digital speeds, you need to take people out of the middle of 
the process” (Roth 2015, 101). This is today’s reality: the market is a 
person- machine system, with the thinking offloaded onto things. If 
anything has changed, it is the scope of the economists’ ambitions.
When listing all the domains and stuff of modern social life that 
could be conceptualized as markets, Roth works himself into a 
frenzy:
Amazon couldn’t have become the marketplace it is with-
out the Internet, which couldn’t have become a market-
place without first computers and then smartphones. And 
smartphones couldn’t have become marketplaces without 
a way to pay for purchases over the phone . . . On the 
Internet, it’s convenient to pay with a credit card. And a 
credit card is also a marketplace . . . [M]arkets include not 
only our experiences at the supermarket or phone store 
but also those in getting into college, finding a job, eating 
62 breakfast— even getting a kidney transplant. (Roth 2015, 
22– 23, 27)
In Roth’s vision, markets will have spread into every nook and 
cranny of human existence: reproduction will be commodified and 
separated from sexual intercourse; performance- enhancing drugs 
will become as common as milk for children and coffee for adults; 
parents will fork out big bucks to purchase better genetic endow-
ments for their children.
Although Roth does acknowledge that some of these developments 
might make the present day reader squeamish, this too shall 
pass, as future generations will come to marvel at why anyone 
ever thought purchasing organs was a big deal. More to the point, 
such squeamishness becomes just another topic of study for the 
market designer, who casts an unsentimental eye upon “repugnant 
transactions,” and sets to the task of creating workarounds. Roth’s 
“100 years” essay serves less as prognostication than as a window 
into the thinking of the present- day market designer, for which ev-
erything becomes a market— down to the very quiddity of the self.
Market design was the unintended consequence of orthodox 
economists grappling with themes introduced by Hayek. None 
of the preceding should be taken to suggest that neoliberals 
concocted market design, only to impose it upon unsuspecting 
economists, thereby foisting neoliberalism upon them. Indeed, not 
all card- carrying neoliberal economists liked what they saw. To take 
but one example, in Roth’s Bank of Sweden lecture (Roth 2012), 
Roth tweaked George Stigler, who in his capacity as editor of the 
Journal of Political Economy rejected early work of Roth on market 
design as “not economics.” For the most part, though, neoliberals 
came around. They have wanted to link their prescriptions to the 
most recent ideas about how markets work, and those ideas have 
fit neoliberal politics to a “T”.
Slowly at first, but then with astonishing rapidity, the aspirations of 
economists and policymakers converged on the task of thoroughly 
63redesigning the organizations of the economic lifeworld from 
bottom to top. Market designers offered to lend their expertise (for 
a price), and with increasing frequency policymakers took them up 
on their offer. This convergence was no accident. Policymaker and 
economist alike came to appreciate how real- world markets came 
to increasingly resemble information processors, and adjusted 
their aspirations in light of this; both would come to attribute im-
mense epistemic capacities to these markets. As a practical matter, 
this justified the piecemeal marketization of government functions 
and ultimately full privatization; as a theoretical matter, this served 
to degrade the cognitive capacities of the agent. Market design 
turned out to be a perfect “fit” for its time, because it constitutes 
the precepts of neoliberalism taken to their logical conclusion.31
Now The Market is not merely an information processor but an 
omnipotent processor of information: That Than Which No Greater 
Can Be Conceived. Markets are somehow both more transparent 
than bureaucracy and yet their design is both too important a mat-
ter and too opaque to leave to democratic deliberation, since the 
democratic public is incapable of comprehending the operation of 
markets. As market participants, people are regarded as the weak 
link in this complex technology, their severe cognitive limitations 
a clear threat to its proper functioning. Consequently, markets are 
less and less conceived as being about giving people what they 
may think they want, and increasingly about operating regardless 
of their wants. Here one finds the terminus of Hayek’s struggles 
with epistemology, with the full neoliberalization of information 
economics.
These “markets” of the market designers were not the markets of 
yore. They might, like conventional markets, rely on prices; but 
then again, like Roth’s kidney exchanges (and Cowlesian central- 
planning schemes), they might not. Yet nor were they exactly the 
same as older structures of bureaucracy. They were something else 
altogether: immensely complex algorithmic procedures, instanti-
ated through the process of bricolage, and offered in the spirit of 
substituting a “reliable” technology of governance for methods that 
64 previously had unfortunately depended on the woefully unreliable 
human element. Consequently, anywhere humans gathered to 
resolve anything— the regulatory committee hearing, obviously, but 
also the voting booth and the corporate boardroom— lurking was 
a candidate for market design. It was the most ambitious program 
in the history of economics: petitioning to repeal the Corn Laws, 
installing a Pigouvian tax, engaging in a bit of macroeconomic 
fine- tuning, or even thoroughgoing economy- wide central planning 
appear quaint by comparison. Market designers offered to assume 
responsibility for reconstructing the nature of Society from top to 
bottom.
Notes
 1 For initial responses to the award, see Boettke (2007) and Tabbarok (2007). 
For one example of a paper devoted to establishing Hayek’s influence on the 
neoclassical orthodoxy, see Skarbek (2009).
 2 Regarding the former, see Boettke (2002). Regarding the latter, see Lavoie 
(1986).
 3 Here and there one encounters the claim that game theory should be viewed 
as an outgrowth of a broader Austrian tradition, yet such claims are advanced 
halfheartedly and without reference to Hayek’s work. See Foss (2000) and 
Kiesling (2015).
 4 The roster of invitees to the George Mason conference included Israel Kirzner, 
Edmund Phelps, Vernon Smith, as well as Maskin— which gives some indication 
of the insights that can be expected from this project.
 5 Pride of place goes to Oguz (2010); other useful sources are Kahlil (2002), 
Lavoie (1985), and Boettke and O’Donnell (2013).
 6 The prehistory of neoliberalism growing out of Weberian sociology has been 
the subject of recent intensive research by Nick Gane (see Ossandón 2014).
 7 It may not be amiss to point out this structural similarity to Shannon’s use of 
entropy was one reason the Hayekian “first movement” proved so popular well 
outside the professional precincts of economics, as in artificial intelligence.
 8 On the structure of associationist psychology, see Daston (1978) and Mandel-
baum (2015).
 9 It has not been clear to subsequent commentators just how different, and 
even opposed, were Polanyi’s and Hayek’s philosophies of knowledge. This has 
been occluded by assertions that they both believed in similar notions of “tacit 
knowledge.” On this, see Mirowski (1998), Oguz (2010), Bateira (in Dolfsma and 
Soete 2006), and Butos (2010). Nevertheless, the Hayekian version of uncon-
scious rationality was popularized for noneconomists in Gladwell (2005).
6510 See Boettke and O’Donnell (2013, 314): “Radical ignorance is a significant ele-
ment of Hayek’s economic thought.”
11 Rumsfeld was himself a member in good standing of the neoliberal thought 
collective, an avowed acolyte of Milton Friedman. For the quote, see Rumsfeld 
(2010). It has been reported that Donald Rumsfeld, in a speech at Milton Fried-
man’s ninetieth birthday party in 2002, held by the Bush White House to honor 
Friedman’s legacy, said, “Milton [Friedman] is the embodiment of the truth that 
ideas have consequences.”
12 See, for instance, Diamond (2012).
13 Cowan, David, and Foray propose a similar taxonomy— articulated, unartic-
ulated, and inarticulable knowledge— without citing Hayek, only to reject the 
third category as “not very interesting for the social sciences” (2000, 230). This 
paper shows just how misguided their judgment was.
14 The NSF/CEME series ran yearly; its roster of participants included nearly every 
major figure in postwar microeconomics.
15 “The comparative merits of alternative systems are typically being debated 
under such labels as centralization against decentralization, social control or 
planning against free markets, or in similar terms. This dichotomy was present 
in the famous Mises- Hayek- Lange- Lerner controversy concerning the feasibility 
of socialism . . . A survey of the literature will show that issues concerning the 
proper internal structure of business and other large organizations involves 
[sic] similar dichotomies” (Hurwicz 1971, 80). For a recollection of this work, see 
Reiter (2009).
16 He associates what he calls “high modern social science” with “an abiding 
interest in the means by which systems store, process, and communicate infor-
mation about themselves and their environments, often expressed through the 
formal analysis of information” (Heyck 2015, 11).
17 “Problems of economic policy may be grouped in two broad classes which may 
be loosely described as those involving choice of the value of a ‘parameter’ 
within a given system of economic institutions and those involving choice 
among institutions . . . Examples of the second type include the design of ‘new’ 
economic systems, such as were embodied in the Yugoslav economic reform of 
1968” (Mount and Reiter 1974, 161).
18 Varian’s career may be taken as a better indicator of the profession’s changes. 
Formerly a professor at University of California, Berkeley, and a well- known 
writer of a widely read graduate textbook in microeconomics, Varian now 
serves as chief economist for Google.
19 According to Roger Myerson, Vickrey had produced “the one great paper with a 
truly modern treatment of information before Harsanyi” (2004, 1818).
20 One example of this shared enthusiasm is Wilson’s contribution to the study 
of “decentralization under uncertainty” (Wilson 1969b). For his contributions to 
Social Choice Theory, see Wilson (1969a; 1969c).
21 Interestingly, Alvin Roth would also study under Wilson. We discuss the work of 
Roth in more detail below. Later, the center of gravity shifted to Northwestern 
66 University, as the program initiated there by Stanley Reiter came to house an 
increasing number of game theorists.
22 Milgrom and Weber (1982) is generally regarded as providing the canonical 
model of the Bayes- Nash approach (Krishna 2002, 83– 102; McMillan 1994, 146).
23 One of us has discussed this development in a different context as a shift of 
economics into the realm of the “cyborg sciences” (Mirowski 2002).
24 During the period it was the epicenter of studies in experimental economics, 
George Mason University established a graduate certification in economic sys-
tem design; today, Chapman University (home to Vernon Smith) offers an MS in 
economic system design.
25 “Mechanism design has matured over the past 20 years by focusing on incen-
tive compatibility and political viability. The analysis has usually been carried 
out under the working assumption that infinite computing capacity is always 
available. Any computation required of the individuals or of the system can be 
instantaneously and correctly completed. Of course, any expert in organization-
al computing knows this is clearly wrong” (Ledyard 1993, 122). Ledyard devoted 
the rest of his article to suggesting how to bring together research in organiza-
tional computing and the economics of market design.
26 As we have seen, they failed to convince many Austrians of the same, at least 
regarding the activities of the Walrasian and Bayes- Nash Schools. Their reac-
tions to the design activities of the experimentalists have been more muted, 
possibly because of formal affiliation with the neoliberal project: both Vernon 
Smith and Charles Plott are members of the Mont Pèlerin Society.
27 Although this is not the place to rehearse the argument in its entirety, a strong 
case can be made that the history displays a pronounced tendency in the 
direction of what we have called the “Experimentalist School of Design” (see 
Mirowski and Nik- Khah 2017).
28 Characteristically, Noah Smith seems to miss even this point, assuming instead 
that Smith’s belief that markets can generate asset bubbles disqualifies him as 
a “market- oriented thinker” (N. Smith 2015).
29 See also Hal Varian’s (2002) discussion of Roth’s work in the New York Times.
30 Moreover, Roth makes use of the language of “price discovery,” though he 
tends to waver between the epistemic views of the game theorists and the 
experimentalists (see, esp. Roth 2015, 185– 88).
31 Although we tend to forget it now, pioneers in this effort often wore their 
neoliberal commitments on their sleeve. For example, Charles Plott credited 
his work in design to MPS member James Buchanan’s “constitutional political 
economy” (see Lee 2015).
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Money	Determines	 
Our Situation
Jens Schröter
“Media determine our situation” (Kittler 1999, xxxix). This famous 
statement of Friedrich Kittler, which was the first sentence of his 
well- known book Gramophone Film Typewriter in 1986, was also the 
first sentence of the introduction to the conference in Lüneburg 
in summer 2015, on which this text is based. In German media 
studies today, it is no longer a widely shared premise, since there 
is a general trend toward praxeology or “the practice turn.”1 
Although it is interesting and important to analyze media practices, 
the radicalization of this praxeological turn tends to erase the 
genuine contribution of the media themselves, their own dynamics, 
affordances, and scripts around which media studies ought to be 
centered. In praxeological studies media are all too often explicitly 
or implicitly reduced to neutral tools for the practices of human 
actors or to neutral channels for human intentions— exactly the 
instrumental conception of media criticized by media theory from 
its very inception (as my reading of Callon will show). If media were 
neutral they would be transparent, would have no significance of 
their own, and would therefore not be worth studying at all.
Of course media archaeology, that is, Kittler’s technocentric 
approach, was criticized for its technodeterminism, if one under-
stands this term as the idea that technologies determine human 
practices in the strict sense. But I doubt that Kittler ever made this 
72 argument. To me, it seems that the nonneutrality of media is in 
fact already a very simple logical fact. To say: “The technological 
medium of photography doesn’t determine which kinds of photos 
people in diverse practices want to make” is of course correct. But 
without photography people wouldn’t want to make photographs 
in the first place. They couldn’t even think of doing so. They couldn’t 
even discuss the potentials and limits of their photographic prac-
tices. Logically, the medium predates any practice. To say “There 
is no such thing as photography, but only different photographic 
practices” is simply nonsensical (I will come back to that “praxeo-
centric fallacy” later), because how can you identify the practices 
for your study if you don’t already have a notion of photography 
in mind; a notion that has to be centered in some way or another 
around a differentia specifica of photography in the first place?
To say that media determine our situation first of all means that 
our situation is different when a medium exists. With regard to 
digital technologies this actually doesn’t say much, because digital 
technologies are by definition programmable and have to be 
formed by a situation to be anything whatsoever. But even this 
shows: although digital computing technologies might be widely 
programmable (within the limits of what is calculable at all and 
in reasonable time), their programmability as such can again be 
seen as a specific script. And that script means that situations 
become sedimented and determine future situations (see Schröter 
2004). It seems that there are media with flexible and with less 
flexible scripts. But be that as it may in detail, I just want to insist 
that media cannot be understood as neutral— even if they appear 
transparent from time to time.
This is especially important when we turn to a medium that seems 
to be, on the one hand, neutral to the extreme. That is, of course, 
money (if we can agree that it is a medium).2 Money seems to be 
extremely neutral because it can substitute everything— at least in 
principle. On the other hand, the idea that media determine our 
situation seems in no case truer than in the case of money: “Money 
determines our situation.” Take a conference as an example: Of 
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personnel of the conference (although people with too expensive 
flights might be excluded from attending), but its pure existence 
of course depends on the availability of money. Seen in this way, 
money is nonneutral to the extreme. It is not just a neutral tool or 
a neutral channel through which preexisting entities are realized or 
flow. It is directly relevant to the existence of those entities. Only a 
strange platonic ontology would permit us to say that a given con-
ference existed as such and only was actualized by using money.
I insist on that point because, interestingly enough, money isn’t 
normally treated that way. In particular, hegemonial, so- called 
neoclassical economics3 has always been criticized for conceptual-
izing money as a neutral tool that only makes preexisting practices 
of exchange easier to handle (Keen 2011, 14, 243, 298– 99; see also 
Orléan 2014, 14; Kohl 2014, 59– 94). We find an explicit statement 
already in 1848 in John Stuart Mill:
There cannot, in short, be intrinsically a more insignifi-
cant thing, in the economy of society, than money. It is a 
machine for doing quickly and commodiously, what would 
be done, though less quickly and commodiously, without it: 
and like many other kinds of machinery, it only exerts a 
distinct and independent influence of its own when it gets 
out of order. (Mill 1936, 488; emphasis added)
This statement defines money clearly as a neutral channel that only 
accelerates and facilitates what exists without it. It stands in radical 
opposition to our very daily intuitions, namely that money makes 
the world go round (although interestingly Mill describes money 
as “machinery”). To refer to just one more example: German 
economist Wilhelm Gerloff stated in his book Geld und Gesellschaft 
(“Money and Society”) from 1952 that in “classical theory“ money 
would be seen only as a “neutral” and “indifferent . . . element” 
(1952, 217).4
This neutralization of money is not only incompatible with a 
media studies view in the tradition of Kittler. It also has some 
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aftermath of the so- called financial crisis of 2008, the question 
frequently came up regarding who was to be held accountable. 
That money rules the world was accepted, albeit always with the 
additional question: and who rules money? If money is seen as a 
neutral tool or channel, such a question is the logical next step. 
But this question, often verging on conspiracy theory, ignores the 
basic teaching of media theory that without money (and its scripts 
and dynamics) there would be no “greedy banksters” who want to 
accumulate ever more abstract wealth in the first place. The whole 
idea of potentially unlimited (and therefore somehow unethical) 
greed is possible only if one accepts the premise of money as an 
abstract and therefore potentially infinitely accumulatable  
medium.
Accumulating an infinite amount of, let’s say, apples is impossible, 
simply because they will rot. Moreover, the idea of people exerting 
their power through money was historically, especially in the 
German context, an anti- Semitic cliché. Ultimately, the argument 
was that money is neutral, but is misused by Jewish high finance 
for their more or less sinister goals— this was a central ideological 
element of National Socialism. The difference between schaffendes 
(productive) and raffendes (parasitic) capital, unfortunately still 
sometimes implicit in contemporary discourse,5 is directly related 
to the idea that money is a transparent and neutral channel— it can 
be put to good or bad ends and transmits these indifferently. 
Therefore, media studies can and should contribute to this field 
of problems by providing a description of the specific agency of 
money, its scripts and limitations. But this is a complicated task for 
several reasons— as we will see.
In the second section of this chapter I want to sketch out some 
ideas concerning a possible media- theoretical description of 
money. Some of the relevant theoretical sources are discussed. 
One result of this discussion is that actor- network theory (ANT) 
might be an interesting candidate to work with when describing 
money as a medium. So in sections three and four I will discuss 
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money (and capitalism). I will demonstrate that ANT, at least in its 
current form, is not really suitable for the task of discussing money 
as a medium, especially since its reduces money to a transparent 
channel of pregiven human intentions— contrary to its own claims, 
firstly to describe human and nonhuman actors symmetrically, and 
secondly to only describe entities that make a difference (mediators 
in contrast to sheer intermediaries).6 In the fifth section, I’ll draw a 
conclusion.
Some	General	Remarks	on	 
Media	Theory	and	Money
What could be the genuine contribution of media studies to the 
discussion of money, in contrast to the numerous contributions 
already made by philosophy, sociology, and economics (see, 
e.g., Ingham 2005)? Shouldn’t it be— as already hinted at in the 
introduction— about the mediality of money? The abstract character 
of money seems to contradict this effort immediately, because 
no specific materiality that might be characteristic for the medium 
of money, its mediality, can be defined easily. Money can exist as 
metal coins, as paper strips, as numbers stored and transmitted 
electronically, and in several other forms. So it seems that the 
aforementioned “neutrality of money” is indeed a fact, insofar 
as the effects of money do not to depend on any kind of specific 
mediality.
Perhaps this shows that money is not a medium at all— or at least 
a medium with a very low specificity.7 This might also be the reason 
that theoreticians who are otherwise quite sympathetic to a strong, 
materiality- centered approach like that of Kittler take— when 
discussing money— recourse to Luhmannian systems theory and 
its definition of money as a “symbolically generalized medium of 
communication” (see Luhmann 1994, 230– 71). Ganßmann under-
lines that the recourse to this definition of money already implies a 
kind of repression of money’s materiality:
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power, confidence, truth, love— simply consist of an invo-
cation of concepts which describe agents’ attitudes to-
wards each other or towards norms. Concepts are reified 
as media by theoretical decision. For money, this seems 
to work the other way around. Historically, it appears to 
have started its social role in the form of palpable pieces 
of precious metal. In a long process of social evolution, 
symbolic representations were introduced as substitutes 
for precious metal (coins) in one or the other function of 
money . . . Thus, money is obviously unique among the 
media of communication in terms of its history and the 
direction of its evolution. What, then, is the function of (or 
the motive for) theoretically treating money on a par with 
other such media? (Ganßmann 1988, 288)
Norbert Bolz, one of the authors who played an important role in 
the formation of media studies in Germany in the 1980s, admits 
right at the beginning of his book Am Ende der Gutenberg- Galaxis 
(1993), which contains a chapter explicitly titled “Geld als Medi-
um” (money as a medium), that a certain eclecticism between 
Luhmannian systems theory and the (Kittlerian) theory of media 
is necessary (Bolz 1993, 8). Although this is not directly related 
to the discussion of money later in the book (Bolz 1993, 90– 100), 
it seems to at least be symptomatic of money not easily being 
conceptualized with the usual notions of mediality and materiality. 
For Bolz, following the sociological approach of Luhmann, money 
is defined by its “code paying / not- paying” (1993, 94) and therefore 
a “pure medium of computation, freed of all earthly remainders” 
(1993, 96), meaning of all materiality. Jochen Hörisch wrote in a 
very similar vein:
See, new media make everything new. They free us from 
the dirty aspects characteristic of traditional flows of 
media— from printing ink, from the eucharistic streams 
of blood, as well as from the indecent materiality of the 
pecunia- olet- stream- of- money. The new relations of 
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earthly remainders. (Hörisch 2004, 170)8
But these and similar arguments for a “transcendental” (Bolz 1993, 
95) character of money (that Bolz [2006, 96], following Luhmann, 
compares to the purely formal status of the Kantian transcendental 
ego) are problematic at least in two ways: Firstly, it remains to 
be seen if the description of the “medium” of money “as power 
without characteristics” (Bolz 2006, 94) is really compatible with 
its specific binary code paying / not- paying. To have this code 
and not another one means that money is at least not “without 
characteristics.”
But secondly, more important for my discussion here is the ques-
tion of whether money can really be described (only) as a “code,” as 
Luhmann and Bolz do, meaning as a medium without materiality, 
insofar a (binary) code, as it seems, can be implemented in poten-
tially any materiality without changing. Already in Talcott Parsons, 
who first described money as a symbolically generalized medium 
of communication, “money is ‘essentially a ‘symbolic’ phenomenon 
and hence . . . its analysis required a frame of reference closer to 
that of linguistics than of technology’” (Ganßmann 1988, 290).9
Kittler’s (1992) provocative thesis that “there is no software”— 
meaning that the ethereal and immaterial realm of software 
is erected upon an indispensable material infrastructure 
(hardware)— might also apply to money. Seitter (2002, 183– 86) 
similarly underlines that it is absurd to speak of the immateriality 
of money, already given the fact that even money in the form of 
digital and electronic accounts presupposes an infrastructure of 
hardware, networks, and so on. Winkler (2004, 39) adds that there 
is another profoundly material side to money: there is the law, 
which for example strictly forbids counterfeiting, and the police, 
who will arrest and detain any counterfeiters behind very material 
walls.10
A traditional banknote is already a highly complex material object, 
protected against counterfeiting by holographic elements and 
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be realized in high- tech institutions. In this sense, a banknote is 
not less but even more material than a simple coin made of gold 
(see Schröter 2015). These materialities are by no means exterior 
to the operations of money: the much invoked “trust” that is 
necessary for the functioning of money is based on the (normally 
implicit) assumption that given banknotes are not counterfeited 
or— a fortiori— given electronic bank accounts are displayed cor-
rectly, that my online transactions are secure, and so on. All these 
operations do not only presuppose a law that forbids counterfeit-
ing and manipulation, and a state that effectively punishes illegal 
behavior, but technologies— “technologies of trust”— that make 
illegal behavior detectable and traceable in the first place.11
Therefore, the materiality, meaning mediality, of given tokens of 
money is not an “earthly remainder” (as Bolz and Hörisch put it), to 
be rejected and erased in the near future, but a very precondition of 
the operability of money as such. Here the systematic interrelation 
between “symbolically generalized media of communication” and 
media as technologies comes into focus: only when my business 
partner trusts my money (due to an implicit heterogeneous assem-
blage of technological, juridical and political actors and operations), 
the money I offer can enhance the probability that she will accept 
my offer. This enhancement of the probability of communication 
is exactly the definition of “symbolically generalized media of 
communication” (see Luhmann 1994, 253; Ganßmann 1988, 305). 
Money might be the significant case to develop such a perspective, 
which bridges the gap between hitherto strictly separate definitions 
of medium.
Obviously, the first, decisive step toward an analysis of money from 
the perspective of media theory is hereby complete. Although the 
detailed contours of such a theoretical perspective remain to be 
developed, some further points can already be raised.
The further elaboration of such a theoretical perspective would not 
only entail a rereading of the different theoretical discussions of 
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Seitter, Krämer, etc.); it would also be necessary to read classical 
texts from philosophy, sociology, and, of course, economics for 
traces and building blocks of a media- theoretical perspective on 
money. For example: Menger discusses, in his classical text on the 
“Origins of Money,” in which money is explicitly called a “medium of 
exchange” (1892, 239), the reasons rare metals like gold and silver 
came to be used as money. Ingham classifies Menger’s approach 
to the field of “orthodox” or “commodity” theories of the genesis of 
money that describe the emergence of money out of the exchange 
of commodities: “It is contended that money takes its properties 
from its status as a commodity with intrinsic (or exchange) value. 
These are able to act as media of exchange” (Ingham 2005, xi). 
Metals like silver and gold seem to be “intrinsically” valuable and 
are therefore chosen or at least chosen by the market: Jones (1976, 
775) argues exactly that media of exchange are selected by the 
market, which leads him to reject alongside “intrinsic value” also 
those “physical properties” that can be described as aspects of 
mediality:
The important point is that this commonness is a market 
characteristic of goods rather than an intrinsic physical 
characteristic such as portability, divisibility, or cogniza-
bility. This is not to say that such physical characteristics 
play no role in determining which good will be used as a 
medium of exchange. However the analysis suggests that 
the rationale for using a medium of exchange in the first 
place might be found in the differing market characteris-
tics of goods and the decentralized nature of exchange. 
(1976, 775)
Although he rejects the media- theoretical idea of the importance 
of the materiality of the medium, he does not seem sure. And of 
course the most important characteristic— countability, which is 
no physical but a symbolic property— is not even mentioned. So 
Jones’s argument is at least unclear and has to be confronted with 
approaches that insist that not markets select media of exchange, 
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suppositions for markets. There have never been markets without 
such media (Kohl 2014, 280– 85). This is close to media theory, 
insofar as it says that certain media allow practices like markets. 
And moreover, any concept that argues that money is chosen by 
the market is vulnerable to, for example, institutional theories that 
argue that money can only have “value” if the state guarantees it. 
An institutional- material assemblage seems to be more fundamen-
tal than practices of exchange.
Anyway, the discussion between “orthodox” or “metallist” versus 
“nominalist” or “institutionalist” theories of money is not my central 
concern here, nor is the alleged “intrinsic value” (that might or 
might not result from the labor necessary to produce them) of 
the metals. But Ingham (2005, xiv; see also 132) also states with 
regard to Menger: “Coinage is explained with the further conjecture 
that precious metals have additional advantageous, or ‘efficient’, 
properties— such as durability, divisibility, portability, etc.” This 
aspect is more interesting here: the materials, e.g. gold and silver, 
firstly, cannot easily be produced by ordinary citizens, meaning: the 
coins cannot easily be counterfeited— and that’s far more import-
ant for their operability as the alleged “intrinsic value” of gold and 
silver. The metals are chosen because they can be cut in precisely 
defined pieces that can be counted. They are durable and cannot 
corrode or burn easily— that is, they can “store” value in a reliable 
way (soap bubbles are definitely not very practical as a currency).
Their durability also means that they, secondly, are able to carry 
nominal values in the form of inscriptions that cannot be changed 
easily. The nominal value relates the money- media to a “money 
of account,” which is very central for some approaches to money 
(see Ingham 2005, xvi– xvii). There have been forms of money that 
didn’t carry a nominal value, but in which the value was directly 
related to materiality in the sense that, for example, such and such 
a quantity of gold was correlated to such and such a value (in a 
sense, such money is partially an analog medium). But, firstly, this 
kind of money is obviously prone to corrosion, insofar as any loss 
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value (see Caffentzis [1989, 17– 44] on clipped coins; see Rotman 
[1987, 22– 26] for the argument that this at least caused the 
emergence of nominal values). Secondly, the relation of such and 
such a quantity of gold to such and such a nominal value remains 
of course conventional and is in that sense still not “intrinsic.”
Whatever else money may be, it is a medium that makes it possible 
to attach countable numbers (“prices”) to concrete objects or 
processes, in what may be described as the role of money in the 
operation of “measuring” value (see Ingham 2005; Engster 2014). 
Because of its structural countability, the code of money is digital, 
as Seitter (2002, 181) argues.12 The “convergence between the 
logic of mathematical disciplines . . . and the logic of the mode 
of production,” as Alexander Galloway (2013) puts it in his recent 
critique of speculative realism, is therefore not just a contemporary 
phenomenon “during the period of digital capitalism” (2013, 359), 
as he himself acknowledges in a footnote. The “mathematization of 
production” (359) is implicit in capitalism from its very beginning, 
insofar as value (however it is derived) is expressed, measured, 
and accumulated in the abstract form of exchange value, which 
finally finds its embodiment in digital, countable, and therefore 
mathematically describable money (and even the most complex 
“derivates” traded at stock markets today stem from this basic 
mathematical logic of money). Capitalism is from its very beginning 
the formalization and digitization of economy, even of society as a 
whole.
To sum up: The digital code of money needs media that have a 
certain durability, countability, anticounterfeitability and thus 
trustworthiness (that is the site where materiality is entangled 
with the law and the state), and these properties make certain 
media interesting as money (rather than their status as “precious 
metals”— quite the contrary: their preciousness is the effect of 
those properties). Money is pure countability, operationalized in 
suitable media and therefore it is counted. This last statement is 
not as trivial as it sounds: the point is that the usage of a medium 
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the description of everything in the categories of “less” and “more” 
where more is equated with “better.” The countable, digital specificity 
of money leads (at least potentially) to the phenomenon of accumula-
tion. This fundamental media logic of money is something that is 
repressed in ANT, as we will see below.
But although these quite basic characteristics are irreducible for 
the operations of money, that doesn’t mean, obviously, that the 
media of money have never changed. Besides the media theory 
of money, which was very sketchily hinted at above, there is also 
a media history of money. And the change of the media of money 
is far more complex and interesting than the often repeated 
reductionist teleological trajectory toward ever increasing “imma-
teriality,” in which— as is sometimes suggested13— the medium of 
money reveals its proper essence as digital code. This Hegelian 
figure is questionable for several reasons. Firstly, it is not clear why 
money should unfold in this way at all; it might simply transform 
through a series of historically contingent configurations, in which, 
beside some basic properties that remain stable (otherwise differ-
ent historical phenomena could not even be compared as different 
forms of money), other features radically change due to religious, 
political, social, cultural, or even intermedial reasons— and may 
also change back.14 Secondly, the basic narrative seems flawed: 
is the production of gold coins or paper strips with an imprinted 
nominal value really more “material” than the vast and global net-
work and computer infrastructure necessary for electronic banking 
today? Isn’t it the other way round?
I will mention just one example that is quite interesting in this 
regard: Micronesian stone money (Gillilland 1975). This example 
might at first seem to be confirming the narrative of immaterial-
ization, but stone money has been used for a long time alongside 
newer currencies.
One could debate if this is money at all (see Kohl 2014, 83– 87), but 
at least it is also digital (it can be counted), it is (very) durable, it 
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cannot easily be counterfeited, and it is trusted. But it has at least 
one crucial difference to what we call money today. Due to its 
sheer size and materiality, it cannot be accumulated, you cannot 
pile up an infinite amount as you can, at least in principle, with 
the (in this sense it is true) more dematerialized electronic units 
of currency we have today. So one aspect of the money, namely 
its potential to be accumulated (and to be circulated easily), is 
not given (and it cannot be transported easily, so transportability 
might not be a necessary feature of money). Jappe (2005, 166) even 
argues that such forms of money with an excessive materiality (he 
uses the example of Spartanian metal bars) were invented to block 
the possibilities of accumulation intentionally, because the drive to 
accumulate was seen as disruptive for communal life. This seems 
to be consistent with the historical studies by Jacques LeGoff (2012) 
and others (e.g., Kurz 2012, 68– 134), which note that the existence 
of money as such is not identical with the existence of capitalism— 
solely when the accumulation of ever more money becomes the 
[Figure 1.] Stone Money. Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/ 
File:Yap_Stone_Money.jpg. Photograph by Eric Guinther, copyright CC  
BY- SA 3.0.
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I cannot go into that discussion here more deeply. At least this 
discussion suggests that there might be noncapitalist money. Or 
perhaps the stuff called “money” in precapitalist societies isn’t 
money in the modern sense or even money at all.
That points to a final and complicated problem for a media 
theory— namely the relation of the medium of money to society. 
Does the medium determine society (as in the classic Kittlerian po-
sition)? That markets presuppose money seems a case in point. Or 
is it the other way around, insofar there is no trustworthy money 
without the law and the state? Does the usage of money finally 
and unavoidably result in capitalism, that is, a society completely 
centered around the reproduction of the medium— which comes 
close to teleological models of the historical unfolding of the 
medium? On the one hand, the seemingly progressive acceleration 
of the circulation of money (nowadays by transforming money into 
electronic signals) seems to be the necessary precondition for this 
drive to accumulate. On the other hand, this ever increasing and 
accelerating speed of circulation might be the result of the drive to 
accumulate.15
But perhaps the questions are posed wrongly; perhaps this compli-
cated problem (which at least is the problem of the emergence of 
capitalism as such) is better described as a kind of co- constitution of 
money and capital (capital defined as the ongoing and accelerating 
process of making more money out of money). So it seems advis-
able that the further development of a media theory of money tries 
to avoid the sterile discussion on determinism. That’s why it might 
seem promising to use ANT as an approach to analyze the medium 
of money, because ANT’s promise is to avoid distinctions such as 
“technology” (or “medium”) versus “society” in the first place. As 
Latour (2005, 75– 76) writes: “There exists no relation whatsoever 
between ‘the material’ and ‘the social world,’ because it is this very 
division which is a complete artifact . . . There is no empirical case 
where the existence of two coherent and homogeneous aggre-
gates, for instance technology ‘and’ society, could make any sense.”
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Bruno Latour, main protagonists of ANT, closely and will discuss 
their theories of money and capitalism. Both authors explicitly 
addressed that topic, Callon even published a volume entitled 
The Laws of the Markets in 1998 and has since been one of the 
main protagonists of the so- called “performativity of economics” 
debate.16 But my readings will try to show that both authors miss 
(due to a certain “praxeological” bias of ANT) the logic of money 
(and the logic of capitalism). That shows that the development of a 
media theory of money cannot make use of ANT, or at least should 
use the heuristic principles of ANT in a modified way. It may be 
disappointing that the present article doesn’t develop the prom-
ised theory in detail but instead focuses on the critique of other 
approaches. But that’s a necessary beginning to define one’s own 
position— I will come back to this in the conclusion.
The	Repression	of	Money	in	ANT	I:	 
Michel Callon
Capitalism/Kapitalism
Callon writes:
I use the word Kapitalism, with a capital K, to denote the 
reality imagined by everyone who considers the Western 
economic system to be a homogeneous reality, endowed 
with its own logic. The assumption of a homogeneous eco-
nomic reality is made by those who criticize capitalism,17 
thus defined, as well as by those who defend it by talking 
of the market and its laws, in general. Experiments18 in 
past decades have shown that Kapitalism could only be a 
fiction: no program has managed to make Kapitalism exist 
nor to overthrow it. There are only capitalisms. (Callon 
2007, 354; emphasis added)
A typical move for praxeocentric discourses (i.e. discourses implic-
itly or explicitly privileging human practice) is to deny the possibility 
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argument is always that entities are situated in historical and local 
practices and therefore are always different without any underly-
ing homogeneous logic (see Callon 2005, 15: “I don’t believe in A 
Kapitalism that could be reduced to AN impersonal logic.”). Firstly, 
it is simply not true that the critics of capitalism, at whom Callon’s 
argument is obviously directed (which is presumably why he uses 
the German- sounding “Kapitalism” to allude to the Marxist tradi-
tion), postulate a homogeneous entity called “capitalism.” “They” 
always admitted that capitalism has had historical phases named, 
for example, “imperialism” and “state- monopolistic capitalism” or, 
in another theoretical vein, “Fordism” and “post- Fordism,” or that 
there is “uneven development,” etc. They just postulated that capi-
talism has one or more fundamental principles that remain in  
place below historical and local differences (as is the case when  
we speak of the media logic of money); that is why Marx analyzes 
capitalism in “its ideal average” (Marx 1991, 970; see Hodgson 
2016).
Secondly and far more importantly, Callon unwittingly admits that, 
too: how could he even speak of “different capitalisms”? He presup-
poses a fundamental principle common to all these capitalisms or 
otherwise he couldn’t even classify the different phenomena under 
the same label. Consider this symptomatic quote by Callon:
Instead of assuming, for example, the existence of a spirit 
of capitalism or an overall logic of a mode of production, 
we can relate certain forms of economic activity to the 
more or less chaotic, regular, and general upsurge of 
calculative agencies formatted and equipped to act on the 
basis of a logic of accumulation and maximization. (Callon 
2005, 5)
At first the idea of an “overall logic of a mode of production” is 
negated— but then self- contradictorily “a logic of accumulation and 
maximization” (that is of course the logic of capitalist accumulation) 
is reintroduced.
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texts, and it finds its most radical expression in a statement he 
quotes approvingly: “Rationality is always situated” (Callon 1998b, 
48). Clearly, this is not even a false statement— it is as nonsensical 
as the statement “there is no truth,” because it contradicts itself: it 
states as universally true, that is as nonsituated, that every truth is 
situated. For Callon, it seems to be universally rational to assume 
that rationality is never universal but always situated— that is self- 
contradictory. A radical praxeocentrism dissolving everything into 
locally and historically situated occurrences is logically impossible: 
it could not even compare two different occurrences to highlight 
their local specificity, because to compare them, a general principle 
of comparison (e.g. that both occurrences are “practices”) already 
has to be taken into account.
One of the main goals of Callon’s whole approach, and one I find 
quite appealing, is to show that markets are nothing natural and 
that the calculative agencies required in markets have to be con-
structed. Although Callon (1998b, 6) rejects “sociocultural frames,” 
he mentions such things as the law and the state, which also were 
named as preconditions for markets in the Marxian tradition (see 
Pashukanis 2002). But he insists particularly on the way in which 
homo economicus is produced. While the homo economicus would in 
the Marxian tradition perhaps be subsumed under the admittedly 
problematic notion of “ideology,” Callon is more interested in the 
concrete tools and operations that produce “calculativeness” on 
the side of the human actors and “calculability” on the side of the 
objects. Immediately, the question arises, what is calculated and 
why there is calculation at all? “Competition between calculative 
agencies . . . is largely determined by the respective qualities of 
the calculating devices. The probability of gain is on the side of 
the agency with the greatest power of calculation . . .” (Callon 
1998b, 45).
Competition and the goal of “gain” are presupposed here and explain 
why calculation is used. This implies that Callon presupposes a 
social form in which any entity besides their specific and unique 
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an abstract value can be calculated. Without using these Marxian 
notions, he admits this in one of his examples (see Callon 2007, 
336– 39), Norwegian fishers that are turned into economic subjects 
by transforming the fish into calculable “cyborg- fish”; that is, 
commodities. This is nothing else than a reinvention of what Marx 
(1990, 873– 907) called “primitive accumulation,” in which objects 
are violently transformed into objects that have exchange value 
(and besides may be useful).19 For Marx, primitive accumulation is 
the precondition of the establishment of capitalist societies. But 
Callon does not use the term “value” systematically in The Laws of 
the Markets. Sometimes he speaks of “usage value” (1998b, 33) or 
“use value” (35), “exchange value” is only to be found in a quote 
(19), so that basically it remains unclear what exactly is calculated in 
Callon’s approach.20
Calculation	and	Money
At this precise point we have to return to the question of a “spe-
cific logic.” Shouldn’t we say that the reduction of everything to 
exchangeable, calculable abstract quantities— a process that is 
also implied in Callon’s central notion of “framing” (see below)— is 
specific to capitalism? This is at least the answer Marxian theory 
would give: capitalism is most generally to be understood as the 
total reign of the abstract value- form, represented in money, 
meaning that everything, especially labor- power, is turned into 
exchangeable commodities with an exchange value that is mea-
sured or at least represented in its price (see Larsen et al. 2014). 
Due to his praxeocentrism, we should expect that Callon denies 
this, especially since it would force him to accept the existence of 
Kapitalism (with a capital “K”); and this is indeed the case:
There is no Great Divide between societies populated 
by calculative agencies and societies in which the agents 
do not calculate. Even Deleuze and Guattari were on the 
wrong track with their concept of deterritorialization, that 
extraordinary faculty bestowed on capitalism for breaking 
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societies are populated— sometimes even over- populated 
with calculative agencies. (Callon 1998b, 39)
Callon argues that there is no “great” divide between societies with 
and without calculative agencies, because there are no societies 
that do not calculate: there was always calculation, and as a con-
sequence there is nothing special about capitalism; no Kapitalism 
exists. In consequence, we would either have to abandon the 
term “capitalism” or we would have to call all societies, even “so- 
called traditional societies,” capitalist, acknowledging that there 
are indeed only different capitalisms and no Kapitalism with any 
underlying specific principle. But this argument leads Callon to 
argue against himself: by stretching the principle of calculation to 
all societies and thereby erasing any (small or great) “divide,” he is 
the one who homogenizes unduly.
It is difficult to understand why he rejects, on the one hand, a ho-
mogenizing principle (“Kapitalism”) that allow us to relate different 
“capitalisms” to each other and, on the other hand, introduces an 
even wider homogenizing principle— calculation as such— that 
surprisingly and ahistorically unites “traditional societies” (by 
which, I guess, he means so- called primitive societies) and modern 
industrial capitalism under one category. His argumentation, 
however, is not only logically unconvincing but also historically 
wrong. If we assume that Callon relates the question of calculation 
to the existence of money (because he talks about the economy 
and not about mathematics), he would have to argue (if calculation 
is his homogenizing principle) that the sheer existence of money 
already means that there is capitalism. But that’s wrong. As already 
mentioned, as Jacques Le Goff (2012) and others have shown, even 
the existence of money (as a materialization of calculation) does 
not make a society capitalist. Money is much older than capitalism.
The question is if a society is centered around money and its scripts 
(to use a term from Akrich’s 1992 essay). Only when the basic script 
is M- C- M’, meaning that money (M) is used to produce commodities 
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fundamental for all activities— only then we can speak of capitalism 
(see, for a recent and particularly pointed argument, Lotz 2014). At 
least this is a definition that avoids the confusion created by Callon. 
This script (M- C- M’) is the definition of capital, according to Marx 
(1990, 247– 57): capital is the process of making more money out 
of money. Marx (1990, 166– 67) writes: “They do this without being 
aware of it.” Marx’s definition implies that there is a script to money 
regulating our practices. Money is not just a transparent means for 
human ends existing independently of money as a praxeocentric 
theory would have it— and as neoclassical economics as a form of 
praxeocentrism21 puts it, in which money plays nearly no role (see, 
among a lot of other authors, Pahl 2008, 9– 16).
Money is, as media theorists like Sybille Krämer (2005, 88– 89) 
underline, the medium of calculability. It is pure quantity and there-
fore its quantum can only diminish or grow. It is not surprising that 
in its practical use its quantum diminishes or grows. It is also not 
surprising that economic actors “calculate,” as Callon rightly insists, 
because money can only be calculated with. All markets should 
be (and practically are) centered around calculability. But Callon 
always insists in a typically praxeocentric manner that there are 
only different markets: “The idea of the market as a unified category 
and institution is progressively disappearing” (Callon, in Barry and 
Slater 2002, 291). Yet surely no one would trade and calculate 
on markets if the outcome wasn’t more money than the amount 
invested.
Callon (1998b, 12) states: “The agent is calculative because action 
can only be calculative.” Firstly, this statement fails to differentiate 
economic practice (“action”) from every other practice and thereby 
again underlines the status of calculation as Callon’s homogenizing 
principle. Secondly, Callon deduces calculativeness from action 
(“because action can only be calculative”), that is, from practice 
and not from the central role of a medium whose script is pure 
calculability. Although the role of devices, technologies, and so on 
is so central for Callon’s argument, they are (at least sometimes) 
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especially (and very significantly) the case for money. It seems that 
Callon, implicitly following the economic mainstream, also follows 
the neoclassical mainstream’s exclusion and oblivion of money.22 
In Callon’s discourse the script of money tends to disappear, and 
although Callon implies, as I have cited above, the goal of “gain” 
as central for markets (Callon 1998b, 45), the explicit “imperative 
of profitability is absent” (Fine 2003, 480). We can expect that this 
discursive operation appears as a reduction and erasure of the 
pure quantitativeness, calculability, and abstraction of money: that 
is, its mediality. That is exactly the case.
Money,	Commodity,	Production
Callon begins with describing the specific medial form of money:
To be sure its main contribution was to provide a unit of 
account without which no calculation would be possible. 
However the essential is elsewhere. Money is required 
above all— even if this point is often overlooked— to de-
limit the circle of actions between which equivalence can 
be formulated. It makes commensurable that which was 
not so before . . . It provides the currency, the standard, 
the common language which enables us to reduce het-
erogeneity, to construct an equivalence and to create a 
translation . . . It is the final piece, the keystone in a me-
trological system that is already in place and of which it 
merely guarantees the unity and coherence. Alone it can 
do nothing; combined with all the measurements preced-
ing it, it facilitates a calculation which makes commensu-
rable that which was not so before. (Callon 1998b, 21– 22; 
emphasis added)
At first sight, he seems to acknowledge the script of money— but 
with a significant twist: money is added as the endpoint of a 
metrological chain of measurements operating in a world without 
money. There is a world performatively produced as calculable 
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piece.” “Alone it can do nothing”— meaning it is reduced to an inter-
mediary, that is an entity that “transports meaning or force without 
transformation” (Latour 2005, 39). But again he doesn’t explain 
how “equivalence” is achieved, how money is related to “measure-
ment”: that is, what it measures. Yet some theory of value would be 
needed, which Callon does not provide.
But to reduce money to the “final piece” also negates that in the 
world we live in everything is already produced with regard to 
money. Nothing is produced that doesn’t at least potentially yield 
more money than was invested— and this rule even shapes the 
commodities in a very concrete way: think of so- called planned 
obsolescence (see Bulow 1986). In Callon’s model23 money is 
added as a market device to a production devoid of money— even 
more so: production does not appear. To be sure, “producers” are 
mentioned a lot (Callon 1998b, 18, 19, 20, and passim), but there is 
no description or theory of production. But if production is already 
structured with regard to money, money is not just a practical 
means of exchange. Commodities are things that have a price; that 
is, they are equivalent to some amount of money. Being a com-
modity means being a thing and being money.
Callon (1999, 189) writes about the being of a commodity: “to 
transform something into a commodity, it is necessary to cut the 
ties between this thing and other objects or human beings one by 
one.” The central notion here is “framing”:
a clear and precise boundary must be drawn between 
the relations which the agents will take into account and 
which will serve in their calculations, on the one hand, 
and the multitude of relations which will be ignored by 
the calculation as such, on the other. (1999, 186– 87; see 
also Callon 1998c)
The objects simply seem to be there, out of nothing, and framing 
seems to mean ripping them out of, for example, emotional con-
texts to sell them. This looks more like a flea market than a real 
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markets. Callon (1999, 189) writes: “one is not born a commodity, 
one becomes it.” This is simply wrong for the vast majority of ob-
jects surrounding us.
Although the book is called The Laws of the Markets, Callon speaks 
right on the first page of the introduction of “economy” (1998b, 1), 
as if markets and (capitalist) economy were identical. He only talks 
about markets. This is also typical for the neoclassical approach, 
which tends to focus on exchange (see, for example, Orléan 2014, 
37). To argue that way is to erase production, which means to 
erase capital from the picture, understood as M- C- M’. Capital in 
this sense means that the production of commodities is part of the 
movement of value, where commodities and money are in a way 
the same, namely metamorphoses of capital (see Marx 1990, 255). 
It seems that Callon has this theoretical (Marxian) argument in 
mind when he writes:
Money seems to be the epitome of the commodity; it is 
pure equivalence, pure disentanglement, pure circulation. 
Yet, as Viviana Zelizer showed so convincingly, agents 
are capable of constantly creating private money which 
embodies and conveys ties . . . This is the case of grand- 
mothers who gives her grand- daughter silver coins, or 
supermarkets which give fidelity vouchers to their cus-
tomers. (Callon 1999, 190)
It is strange that Callon defines the commodity by framing, that 
is untying (“cut the ties between this thing and other objects or 
human beings one by one” [1999, 189])— but at the same time 
doubts that money is “disentanglement” and follows Zelizer (1998) 
on “money which embodies and conveys ties.” With this argument, 
he again separates commodities from money (because only com-
modities seem to follow the basic operation of “framing”), although 
commodities can only be understood as commodities in relation 
to money. Giving away a thing on the market (and in that sense 
“untying” it from me as the seller) means exchanging it against 
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in that sense it is “pure disentanglement.” It is a basic move in 
Callon to tear apart money and the commodity— to erase the basic 
logic of capitalism.
Or see a similar quote from a different publication:
Earmarking is deployed as much in the domestic sphere, 
with silver coins which a grandmother gifts to her grand-
children to put in their piggybanks in memory of her, as 
in systems of mass distribution, with vouchers, fidelity or 
credit cards and other such devices. (Callon 1998b, 35)
This is highly symptomatic: the coins grandma gives her grand-
daughter are treated as “private money,” that is a form of money 
proper, although these coins cannot be exchanged against com-
modities. Grandma can give as many coins as she wants to her 
granddaughter, she could even produce new “private money” by 
writing the word money on paper snippets as much as she likes, but 
she shouldn’t try to go to a supermarket (even to one that emits 
vouchers) and try to acquire commodities with the private money.24 
“Private money” is not money at all.
Armin Beverungen made an important comment on an earlier 
version of this text. He problematized the formulation “private 
money is not money at all,” by invoking as an example M- Pesa, a 
very successful digital currency issued by Vodafone and Safaricom, 
first realized in Kenya in 2007. He seemed to understand my 
argument as directed against all currencies that are emitted by 
privately owned companies, although I made it only in relation to 
Callon’s example, which isn’t about a privately owned company but 
about “silver coins which a grandmother gifts to her grandchildren” 
(Callon 1998b, 35). Money emitted by private companies can be 
money in the full sense, as the case of M- Pesa shows (my sources 
are Hughes and Lonie 2007; Makin 2011; Wölbert 2015). Firstly, the 
whole development was subsidized by a public- sector challenge 
grant, meaning that M- Pesa is not a child of private enterprises 
alone. But secondly, and far more importantly, it was developed in 
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ment concerning questions of security, customer identity, trust-
worthiness, and so on. The forms of state currency are, at least 
partially, mapped onto the digital currency, otherwise it wouldn’t 
work. In that sense, it remains deeply connected to the law and 
the state. Thirdly, it is therefore not an alternative to the official 
state currency: costumers go to an agent, where they can deposit 
or withdraw cash from their e- money accounts. That means that 
M- Pesa is convertible into official state currency and vice versa. It is 
just a different form of distribution for state currency.
None of the three points apply to “silver coins which a grand-
mother gifts to her grandchildren.” Callon’s example is from the— 
as he writes— “domestic sphere” and therefore really private. And 
this type of private money is not money at all, whereas M- Pesa, 
deeply anchored in state currency, law, the state, and so on, is 
money. We should avoid confusing the two meanings of “private,” 
on the one hand the “private” (in the sense of “domestic”) sphere 
and on the other hand “privately owned” companies (in contrast 
to, let’s say, state departments). Tokens circulating in the “private 
sphere” are not money. Seitter (2002, 188; my translation) writes: 
“What Wittgenstein said of language, although he spoke of ‘lan-
guage games,’ is true for money too: there is no private language.” 
Human actors can of course name anything “money,” but that doesn’t 
turn it into money— which demonstrates that there’s an irreducible 
script that cannot be easily changed by different practices.
Callon (1998b, 35, 54) gives an example of a prostitute who writes 
the day and the date of an especially beautiful night with a client on 
a banknote— this is an example that “the banknote is an excellent 
medium for the exercise of rewriting.” Apart from the interesting 
point that he explicitly calls the banknote a medium, he wants to 
argue that money is not abstract and that its “official attachments” 
can be “overloaded” with “new, private, messages” (1998b, 35). 
What does he want so say? Of course, I can use a banknote as 
medium of writing, but if he wants to suggest that the role of 
money is thereby changed from the universal equivalent, pure 
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banknote might be) this is simply outlandish. In a similar way, you 
could say that you can change the rules of soccer by writing some 
personal notes on the ball. Money is again severed from the notion 
of commodity. The script of money is repressed in favor of practices by 
human actors. ANT’s own principle of symmetry is violated. Remember 
Latour’s (2005, 76) formulation: “To be symmetric, for us, simply 
means not to impose a priori some spurious asymmetry among 
human intentional action and a material world of causal relations.” 
But Callon exactly establishes such an asymmetry.
The	Repression	of	Money	in	ANT	II:	 
Bruno Latour
One can find a similar repression of money in the work of Bruno 
Latour, which suggests that this repression might be characteristic 
for the whole discourse of ANT. Latour writes, discussing capitalism 
in a way similar to Callon:
Once its ordinary character is recognized, the “abstrac-
tion” of money can no longer be the object of a fetish 
cult . . . “Capitalism” is . . . an empty word as long as pre-
cise material instruments are not proposed to explain any 
capitalization at all, be it of specimens, books, information 
or money. (Latour 1986, 31)
Hence, Latour criticizes the description of money as a fetish 
based on the abstraction of value (central to modern sociality in 
a Marxian perspective). Although this complex topic cannot be 
discussed here in detail, Latour is of course alluding to Marx’s 
notion of the fetish (see Marx 1990, 163– 77).25 Somewhat similar 
to Callon, Latour argues against the Marxian tradition. Money, 
according to Latour, is “ordinary” because it resembles other 
immutable mobiles. What does this term mean? It refers to all 
processes that transmit specific information that remains stable 
during this process of transmission. Latour mentions “printing, 
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collectively, cartographic discoveries, the camera obscura; and also 
processes for accounting and for producing graphs, tables and 
statistics of all kinds” (Schüttpelz 2009, 70). These processes enable 
the accumulation of knowledge in what Latour calls centers of cal-
culation, that is, military high commands, government authorities, 
and scientific and bureaucratic centers of power. This accumulation 
of knowledge allows to rule the entities about which knowledge 
has been accumulated. Hence, Latour (1986, 13) writes on the role 
of the immutable mobiles in the history of “the West”: “Anything 
that will accelerate the mobility of the traces that a location may 
obtain about another place, or anything that will allow these traces 
to move without transformation from one place to another, will be 
favored.” Schüttpelz (2009, 70; emphasis added) explains:
Every increase in mobility and every increase in immu-
tability through transformations can help organizations 
to regulate the distances in a space and obtain small 
organizational advantages in an agonistic relation to other 
organizations.
Latour’s demand for “precise material instruments” means that the 
fetish remains an all- too- nebulous description; by way of contrast, 
immutable mobiles (in Latour’s view) make it possible to explain 
the dynamism of capitalism as a process of “capitalization.” Instead 
of saying “capital is the movement of the valorisation of value” (as 
Marxians would have it), the question would be: “how is this ac-
cumulation (capitalization) of money realized in detailed terms?”26 
Money is one immutable mobile among others in this regard. 
Returning to Latour:
As soon as money starts to circulate through different 
cultures, it develops a few clear- cut characteristics: it is 
mobile (once in small pieces), it is immutable (once in 
metal), it is countable (once it is coined), combinable, and 
can circulate from the things valued to the center that 
evaluates and back . . . As a type of immutable mobile 
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tion . . . Money is neither more nor less “material” than 
map making, engineering drawings or statistics. (Latour 
1986, 30– 31)
Obviously, Latour agrees in principle with the media- theoretical 
descriptions of money given in section one of this chapter. But 
the following two key questions arise from this outline of Latour’s 
argument:
(a)	Symmetry	of	the	immutable	mobiles? Categorizing money 
amongst other equally ranked immutable mobiles could be 
problematic— in two ways: it could, first, be that the relation of 
money to other immutable mobiles is asymmetric and, second, 
following on from the first point, Latour’s argument could be 
problematic because it ignores the centrality of money at least in 
capitalist societies. Schüttpelz writes:
Latour’s observation brings the continuity of scientific 
practice into focus, as well as the unceasing, time- and 
capital- intensive maintenance of symbolic stability . . . The 
actual establishment and heightening of the combined 
properties of “mobility” and “immutability” are based on 
conditions that are neglected in many media histories, 
especially a significant increase in capital expenditure 
for transport infrastructure and education as well as for 
state and commercial research investment since the late 
18th century. It was only with this investment that carto-
graphic recording of European and non- European terri-
tories was stabilized and unified; and this investment did 
indeed lead to the far more consistent text reproduction 
of 19th- century printing . . . Media innovation, technical 
standardization and laboratory culture were first united 
in the laboratory of the 19th century, and this already 
presupposed a whole host of capital- and time- intensive 
developments. (Schüttpelz 2013, 36)
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mutable mobiles— mobility and immutability— are conditioned 
above all by “capital expenditure” and “investment.” Clearly, money 
and its accumulation are the condition of possibility for other im-
mutable mobiles— and indeed, the complex machinery and media 
of recording and dissemination all cost money for development, 
procurement, and utilization. But then money is precisely not one 
immutable mobile among others but their conditio sine qua non.27 
All media (at least in capitalism) presuppose money for their tech-
nological infrastructure, their skilled workers, the production of 
their content. This is a first indication of a fundamental asymmetry. 
There are other such indications.
Latour (2005, 30) himself emphasizes, as one of the key method-
ological premises of ANT, that “actors, too, have their own elabo-
rate and fully reflexive meta- language.” Unlike “critical sociology,” 
Latour does not wish to “render actors mute altogether”: “Are the 
concepts of the actors allowed to be stronger than that of the 
analysts, or is it the analyst who is doing all the talking?” (2005, 30). 
How can this premise be combined with the presupposed ordinari-
ness of money— in view of the phenomenon that sentences like 
“Money rules the world” or “Money makes the world go round” are 
part of everyday language, that there is a vast literature of money 
management guides and that the Cree proverb (Daley 2009, 89) 
warning that you cannot eat money once adorned every “alterna-
tive” cafe? Are there not “concepts of actors” that acknowledge that 
money is not just an arbitrary immutable mobile among others? 
Should this not be taken seriously?
Finally, Latour’s account contains a peculiar feature that once again 
indicates an asymmetry. As cited above, he says that money— 
just like the other immutable mobiles28— can “circulate from the 
things valued to the center that evaluates and back.” What does 
this mean? A central authority that evaluates things is precisely 
what is lacking under market allocation— unlike, say, the central 
price- setting in Stalinist planned economies. Moreover, even where 
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proceed by means of money circulating to the center so that things 
can then be evaluated. Or does Latour’s formulation refer to the 
fact that central banks can vary the quantity of money and hence at 
least indirectly alter the value of things, inasmuch as an (excessive) 
increase in the quantity of money would lead to, for example, 
inflation and hence price rises (at least according to monetarist 
theory)? But even if one were to accept this, it would not really 
correspond to the description according to which money can “circu-
late from the things valued to the center that evaluates and back.” 
Latour may be imposing onto money a scheme that works for 
other immutable mobiles, even though it does not quite fit here. 
And this strange reference to a “center that evaluates” suggests 
something else: Latour takes many other examples of immutable 
mobiles from the spheres of the military (see also Law 1987), 
state bureaucracies, or the sciences.29 These examples concern 
technologies that are, in part, highly developed and only usable by 
specialists. By contrast, everyone has to use money. Again, there 
appears to be an asymmetry here.
(b)	What	means	“. . . will	be	favored”? Let us recall the crucial 
sentence from Latour (1986, 13): “Anything that will accelerate the 
mobility of the traces that a location may obtain about another 
place, or anything that will allow these traces to move without 
transformation from one place to another, will be favored.” “Will be 
favored”— why? And by whom? Latour (1986, 14) writes: “It is, first 
of all, the unique advantage they give in the rhetorical or polemical 
situation. ‘You doubt of what I say? I’ll show you.’” The point is to 
assert one’s own position: immutable mobiles are allies in this 
enterprise, displaying evidence that is hard to ignore. As Schüttpelz 
(2009, 70) clarifies, organizations can “obtain small organizational 
advantages in an agonistic relation to other organizations” if they 
increase mobility and “immutability across transformations.” 
Hence, it is a matter of agon and polemos, of competition and even 
war. In both these areas, immutable mobiles are allies. To once 
again quote Latour at length:
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thors, and between them and all the others they need to 
build up a statement? Answer: the one able to muster on 
the spot the largest number of well aligned and faithful allies. 
This definition of victory is common to war, politics, law, 
and, I shall now show, to science and technology. My con-
tention is that writing and imaging cannot by themselves 
explain the changes in our scientific societies, except inso-
far as they help to make this agonistic situation more favor-
able . . . If we remain at the level of the visual aspects only, 
we fall back into a series of weak clichés or are led into 
all sorts of fascinating problems of scholarship far away 
from our problem; but, on the other hand, if we concen-
trate on the agonistic situation alone, the principle of any 
victory, any solidity in science and technology escapes us 
forever. We have to hold the two eyepieces together so 
that we turn it into a real binocular. (Latour 1986, 5)
It is becoming clear that the “agonistic situation” is being 
presupposed— initially, it would appear, as equiprimordial with the 
“level of the visual aspects,”30 that is the immutable mobiles. But 
it is more: it is a “reference point” (1986, 13); it is the driving force 
behind the use of immutable mobiles that are increasingly mobile 
and increasingly immutable. To quote Latour (1986, 18) again: “This 
trend toward simpler and simpler inscriptions that mobilize larger 
and larger numbers of events in one spot, cannot be understood 
if separated from the agonistic model that we use as our point 
of reference.” The “agonistic model” is thus posited in order to 
explain the genesis of immutable mobiles— and not vice versa. It is 
already there.
What exactly the various organizations are that stand in an 
agonistic relation is made clear in a passage in Schüttpelz (2009, 
106): “Standardization always occurs agonistically: in competition 
with other companies (or state authorities) and with the intention 
of commercial (or bureaucratic) expansion.” Can it not be said 
that a certain commercial and thus market- economic model of 
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Keen 2011, 74– 102), provides the template for Callon’s agonistic 
model? And doesn’t that remind us of the positions that the media 
suitable as money are selected by the market— thereby privileging 
the practice of exchange over the medium, even though historical 
studies have shown that markets are the effect of money and not 
its precondition?
And	finally: Does this not fundamentally contradict Latour’s own 
elaborate efforts in the entire first part of his Reassembling the 
Social to distinguish ANT from conventional sociologies precisely 
inasmuch as for ANT “there is no preferable type of social ag-
gregates” (Latour 2005, 40)? Instead of presupposing what the 
ingredients of the social are, ANT aims to observe how actors form 
bonds with each other. But how, then, can it assume an apparently 
universal “agonistic model,” especially when ANT “maintains 
there is nothing that is purely universal” (Koch 2009, 6)? How, for 
instance, can it reject the a priori conviction that “society is unequal 
and hierarchical” (Latour 2005, 64) from the outset but accept that 
it is agonistic and polemical (instead of, say, cooperative, what 
doubtlessly can also be observed31) from the outset? How can 
one of its “basic hypotheses” consist in “the refusal to give an a 
priori definition of the actor” (Callon 1999, 182)32 and yet its actors 
nonetheless be defined as a priori antagonistic? There seems to be 
a certain conflict between the methodological premises of ANT and 
a certain ideological subtext in Latour.
This observation can be confirmed by critically discussing the idea 
of “description” central to ANT: Latour insists that the task of ANT 
is pure and neutral description: “I told you, we are in the business 
of descriptions“ (2005, 146). But a “pure description” without any 
premises is impossible; even if it were possible, it is never com-
pleted, because networks are infinite; and even if it were possible 
and it could be completed in a meaningful way, the question still 
remains what exactly the use is in simply doubling and mirroring 
an existing practice (and/or network). Purely doubling the practices 
of actors makes social science superfluous— Callon, by the way, 
103admits that: after having written “that social scientists don’t have 
special access to a truth that would be inaccessible to actors 
themselves,” some lines later he states:
The role of the anthropology of (the) econom(y)ics [sic] 
is, I believe, to make these anthropological struggles ex-
plainable in their theoretical and practical dimensions, by 
identifying and revealing the forces that, in a more or less 
articulated way, challenge the dominant models and their 
grip on real markets. (Callon 2005, 12; emphasis added)
Here, the social scientist or anthropologist “reveals” and “identifies” 
something, meaning that it obviously has been hidden and misun-
derstood before, hidden to the actors involved and misunderstood 
by them. Obviously, scientists also according to Callon need access 
“to a truth that would be inaccessible to actors themselves”— 
otherwise they simply would be no scientists and couldn’t “explain” 
anything, a notion Callon uses in the quote. The intended pure 
description is not possible. Description is always already affected 
by background models. The conclusion seems unavoidable that 
the “agonistic model” is precisely one such ideological and political 
model structuring the discourse of ANT— or at least ANT as per-
formed by Callon and Latour.
That would only be permissible if this model were proclaimed to 
be the “natural” and hence only possible form— but this would 
contradict not only the premises of ANT33 but also historical 
observations to the effect that societies have by no means always 
been organized in a market form and indeed that a “disembedding” 
of markets (from religious and guild structures) was required to 
make them into a central mediating entity in modern societies (see 
Polanyi 2002).
One conclusion that emerges from points (a) and (b) is that the 
rejection of the “fetish cult” in favor of “precise material instru-
ments” in order to explain capitalization has two problems. First, 
the “precise material instruments” appear to presuppose money 
as their condition of possibility, which means that money cannot 
104 be symmetrically categorized among the other immutable mobiles. 
Money determines the situation of the immutable mobiles too. 
And, second, the development and distribution of the immutable 
mobiles apparently depends on an “agonistic model”— the 
market— that in the context of Latour’s argument appears to be 
ahistorical34 and possibly even an anthropological norm, whereas 
critical approaches, such as neo- Marxian theory, conversely 
attempt to describe and explain the historical establishment of this 
(or other) model(s).
Instead of being one immutable mobile among others, money 
seems to be— as my reading of Latour tries to show— their model. 
But this knowledge of the centrality of money and how Latour 
in his theoretical practice follows the scripts of the medium (and 
thereby contradicts his manifest praxeocentrism) is repressed.
It is interesting that there is a kind of mirror symmetry between 
Callon and Latour on money. Callon upholds an a priori asym-
metry between human actors and money, reducing the latter to 
a tool and neutral channel, to an intermediary (in the jargon of 
ANT), of human practices. Even more so: “Agents are capable of 
constantly creating private money” (Callon 1999, 190)— but the 
reverse, i.e. that money creates agents or actors (or at least parts 
of their behavior) through its scripts, does not appear. In that 
sense his discourse is clearly praxeocentric and reproduces the 
praxeocentric fallacy. Latour seems to more strictly follow his own 
methodological premises, insofar he avoids any a priori asymmetry 
between money and other immutable mobiles. But in doing this 
he obviously doesn’t follow the actors, who would surely underline 
the central role of money for their practices and the myriad ways in 
which money determines their situation (remember: no conference 
without money). In this way he erases the central role that money 
plays in relation to all other nonhuman actors.
So in fact we can find a double repression of money in the discourse 
of ANT: One concerning the relation between money and human ac-
tors and one concerning the relation between money and nonhu-
105man actors (or to be more precise: that subset of nonhuman actors 
that Latour calls “immutable mobiles”). My critique does not mean 
that the theoretical and methodological interventions made by ANT 
are not useful for the study of money, especially when one tries to 
avoid the trap of determinisms. Moreover, I would argue, strictly 
adhering to the methodological principles of ANT would have 
avoided the double erasure of money— it seems to me that implicit 
political assumptions (connected to the nearly phobic avoidance of 
“critique”35) in Callon and Latour distort the possibilities of ANT.
A media theory of money to be developed can and should 
nevertheless draw on ANT and connect it to the theoretical 
resources available from media studies, philosophy, sociology, and 
economics. First of all, the idea of a symmetry between human 
and nonhuman actors should be taken seriously by granting the 
nonhuman actors agency. Money should be conceived neither a 
neutral tool nor as just one immutable mobile among others, but 
having a specific agency as a historically grown material, juridical, 
and governmental assemblage (or actor- network, if you like). Or 
to put it again in ANT- terms: money became a black box that now 
indeed operates as a determining force— this black- boxing process 
might explain why human actors normally take for granted that 
“money makes the world go round.” This analysis might lead at the 
end to an— horribile dictum— informed critique of money; beyond 
a critique of the (perhaps “wrong”) uses of money,36 a political 
critique that may seem necessary today, more necessary than it 
ever was. It might in the end point to the possibilities of postmon-
etary societal structures, a discussion that has already begun: 
Rifkin (2014) argues for the possibility of “collaborative commons” 
replacing markets (see also, among many others, Siefkes 2016).
The conclusion is: When we search for media in markets, we might 
discover that not only the basic scripts of money (calculability, 
durability) changed with its changing medial form (mobility, stabi-
lization through law, and copy protection, etc.) but also that new 
digital technologies might offer completely new forms that even 
106 replace the basic scripts (see Heidenreich and Heidenreich 2015, 
104– 36; Schröter 2017). Just designing new forms of currencies 
that, for example, cannot be accumulated because they lose value 
over time, might not be enough. It might be necessary to ask if 
there could be a co- constitution of new medial and social forms, 
which in the end moves beyond markets and its correlated and 
co- constituted medium: money. In the research project “Society 
after Money: Beginning a Dialogue,”37 which the author started 
together with collaborators from sociology, (heterodox) economics, 
and theory of the commons, such questions are discussed. The 
contribution of media theory (following Seitter, Winkler, and others) 
to this endeavor is the insistence on the different layers of scripts, 
materiality, and “institutionality” of money as a medium— and the 
question how they can be described, differentiated, analyzed, and 
perhaps substituted or even made superfluous.
Such historical, empirical, and theoretical research is part of the 
program of “neocritical media studies” that I am proposing (see 
Schröter and Heilmann 2016). This program necessitates three 
steps: First, the rereading of texts on money, trying precisely to 
specify the contribution of media theory to the theory of money 
(in contrast to sociology, philosophy, and economics). The critical 
discussion of certain versions of ANT (not ANT as a whole) in this 
essay was part of this step. Second, a “monetary media archeology” 
has to be developed that rewrites the history of media in relation 
to money and its institutions, and thereby specifies the media his-
tory of money. And third, this should lead to a critical reevaluation 
of media history, part of which would be the rewriting of the media 
history of money. The entanglement and mutual co- constitution of 
specific material properties of money (as discussed in the section 
“Some General Remarks on Media Theory and Money”), law, and 
technologies of the police can be reconstructed historically. In case 
studies it could be shown how the coins made of silver or gold 
are connected to specific juridical and governmental regimes (see 
Caffentzis 1989). Nowadays, the emergence of bitcoins would be an 
interesting case (see Golumbia 2016).
107Finally, when we search for media we might find out that changing 
media and correlated practices and institutions might put an end 
to forms that seemed to be natural— in our example: the formal-
ization and digitization of society as a whole, what we could call 
“capital.” We should at least develop theoretical tools that allow us 
a critical distance.
Notes
 1 See Schüttpelz (2014). See also the very concise general introduction to praxeo-
logical theories in Reckwitz (2003).
 2 Already in his texts from around 1857 or 1858, which were published much 
later as the Grundrisse (Marx 1993), Marx repeatedly called money a “medium 
of exchange.” In 1892, Menger (1892, 239) also called money a “medium of 
exchange”— this shows, by the way, that the notion of “medium” has a history 
in the history of economic thought, which is often overlooked (e.g., in Hoff-
mann 2002, an otherwise impressive history of the notion of medium, the 
description of money as “medium of exchange” is not mentioned). Later in 
1956, Parsons and Smelser (2005, 141) again used the definition of money as a 
medium of exchange. In 1964, Marshall McLuhan (2003, 179– 96) called money 
a medium in his famous study Understanding Media.
 3 To put it in somewhat simplified terms, since there is also the neoclassical- 
Keynesian synthesis and so on; see on its historical emergence Morgan and 
Rutherford (1998). On heterodox currents see Lee (2009).
 4 That this holds true even in modern theories of market equilibrium was shown 
by Hahn (1987).
 5 Although this would need a much more detailed analysis, one could mention 
the recent popularity of Nitzan and Bichler (2009) in so- called accelerationist 
discourse (see, e.g., Malik 2014). Although— of course— Nitzan and Bichler are 
themselves of Israeli origin and cannot be called “anti- Semitic” in any mean-
ingful way, it remains problematic that their model of capital- as- power is built 
on (among other sources) Thorstein Veblen’s difference between industry and 
business (Nitzan and Bichler 2009, 219– 21), which seems to be analogous to 
the difference between productive and parasitic capital— an analogy that was 
already observed by Adorno (1955), who wrote on Veblen: “there is implicitly 
something like parasitic and productive” (1955, 95; my own translation of: “Es 
gibt bei ihm implizit etwas wie raffend und schaffend”).
 6 On symmetry see Latour (2005, 76): “ANT is not, I repeat is not, the estab-
lishment of some absurd ‘symmetry between humans and non- humans.’ To 
be symmetric, for us, simply means not to impose a priori some spurious 
asymmetry among human intentional action and a material world of causal 
relations.” On intermediaries and mediators see Latour (2006, 37– 42). The 
following statement by Latour especially indicates that mediators (in contrast 
108 to intermediaries) are central for ANT: “The real difference between the two 
schools of thought becomes visible when the ‘means’ or ‘tools’ used in ‘con-
struction’ are treated as mediators and not as mere intermediaries.” (2006, 39)
 7 One could debate if it is meaningful to discriminate high and low specificity, 
although digital code (as mentioned above) and money both seem to be of 
low specificity— and, not surprisingly, money has been compared to digital 
code (see Vief 1991). Some argue that the similarity of money and digital code 
regarding their universality may be the source of their conflict, at least as it is 
described in recent, neo- Marxian theories of economic crisis. See, e.g., Meretz 
(2007), who argues that digital data cannot easily be made to conform to the 
commodity form and therefore cannot easily be exchanged against money.
 8 My translation. The German original is: “Siehe, die neuen Medien machen alles 
neu. Sie befreien uns von den schmutzigen Aspekten, die die traditionellen 
Medienströme kennzeichneten— von der Druckerschwärze, vom eucharis-
tischen Blutstrom und auch von der anrüchigen Materialität des Pecunia- olet- 
Geldstroms. Die neuen Kommunikationsverhältnisse sind immateriell. Pixel 
sind weitgehend frei von Erdenschwere.”
 9 Ganßmann is quoting Parsons. On the problems of the notions of medium and 
code in Parsons and Luhmann, see Künzler (1987); see also Esposito (2008).
10 In this regard Winkler’s position is close to chartalist theories of money that 
emphasize the constitutive role of the state for money (see Ingham 2005, 
xx– xxii). As one historical example for the problems of the forgery and manipu-
lation of money, the so- called clipped coins problem in England, see Caffentzis 
(1989, 17– 44).
11 The important role of these technologies is underlined by the fact that they 
themselves are juridically protected— an important mechanism of the entangle-
ment of technology and law (see Senftleben 2010).
12 Krämer (2005, 88– 89) underlines this: “One structural condition must be ful-
filled by every embodiment of money. It has to have the form of an easily trans-
portable, incorruptible piecework, that is: it has to be divisible into elements 
and thereby to be made discrete, so that it can be counted. Money is the stuff 
designed to be countable.” (My translation of: “Eine strukturelle Bedingung 
allerdings muß jede Verkörperung des Geldes erfüllen. Sie muß die Gestalt 
eines einfach zu transportierenden, unverderblichen Stückwerks haben, also in 
Elemente teilbar, mithin diskretisierbar und abzählbar sein. Geld ist der Stoff, 
der auf seine Zählbarkeit hin entworfen ist.”) Therefore, histories of digital 
media should be rewritten to include money.
13 Remember the quote from Hörisch (2004, 170) above, which suggests that 
money becomes more and more immaterial with the advent of “new media.” 
The teleology is: first you have metal coins, then you have more “immaterial” 
banknotes, and then you have total immaterial electronic money. If money is 
digital, then one could argue that the advent of electronic money (administered 
by digital computing systems) is the coming- to- itself of money as such.
14 This is a complicated problem and only some hints can be provided. In times of 
crisis, calls often arise for a return to the gold standard, and most governments 
109today still hold remarkable reserves of gold. This shows that the (theoretically 
disputable) idea of intrinsically precious metals is still very much around (al-
though gold nowadays is not used as money, but as a kind of allegedly stable 
commodity). In times of crisis, new forms of currency (like cigarettes) may also 
take the place of discredited money. These examples contradict a linear teleol-
ogy of dematerialization.
15 See Marx (1992, 203): “The more the circulation metamorphoses of capital are 
only ideal, i.e. the closer the circulation time comes to zero, the more the cap-
ital functions, and the greater is its productivity and self- valorization.” Clearly, 
Virilio’s (1977) well- known diagnosis that modernity accelerates and accelerates 
is a direct effect of the circulation of capital and its tendency toward “zero 
time.”
16 I cannot discuss the problems connected with the notion of performativity 
here; I discuss that at length in another article (see Schröter 2016). In that pa-
per I also discuss the missing theory of crisis in Callon, a topic I do not mention 
here.
17 See Callon (in Barry and Slater 2002, 297): “Capitalism is an invention of anti- 
capitalists.” In a way this statement isn’t very helpful because it is obvious that 
a notion like “capitalism” is the result of a description that is based on a theo-
retical model (e.g. differentiation theorists like Niklas Luhmann wouldn’t use it; 
he would speak of “functionally differentiated society”).
18 The “experiments” seems to be Callon’s term for so- called “real socialism” (see 
Callon 2007, 349).
19 Holm (2007, 239) is very explicit about that: “When the cyborg fish is in place, 
the most violent acts of dispossession against coastal communities have al-
ready been undertaken; the fisheries commons have already been closed; the 
heritage of the coastal people has already been parceled and laid out, ready 
for the auction. With the successful introduction of fisheries resource manage-
ment, most of the organizational and institutional apparatus that could have 
served as a power base for those who want to resist ITQs has already been 
squashed.” We read of “violence” through which the “commons” of the fisher-
men are closed and thereby the fishermen are “dispossessed.” This is exactly 
the process of primitive accumulation as described by Marx. See also Callon 
(1998b, 24, 27) on “extending the spaces of calculation.” See also Holm and 
Nielsen (2007) again on the “cyborg- fish.”
20 The word value is sometimes used in Callon (1998b, 38, 50) in a vaguely moral 
sense: “values” that are opposed to the market.
21 The foundation of neoclassical theory on the principle of “methodological 
individualism” can be described as praxeocentric, insofar as the practices of 
principally isolatable actors (be they human and/or non- human) are the build-
ing blocks of the theoretical model. The relations of praxeocentrism to method-
ological individualism have to be discussed in more detail in future.
22 Callon often speaks of “economics” and of “economists” without specifying 
which economics he means. That suggests he simply accepts the reigning 
mainstream economics: that is, simply put, neoclassical theory (mentioned 
110 e.g. in Callon 1998b, 22; see also Mirowski and Nik- Khah 2008, 96, 117). Callon 
refers to “standard economic theory” (1998c, 247) and marginalist analysis 
(1998c, 247– 48), which is of course part of “standard” neoclassical theory. This 
already negates the conflict in economics between this mainstream and so- 
called heterodox economics (see Keen 2001; 2011 for a scathing critique of the 
neoclassical mainstream; see Lee 2009 on the history of heterodox economics). 
Callon (2005, 11) at least mentions “heterodox or even radical currents”— but 
prefers the orthodox one, presumably because it is dominant (in accordance 
to his theory of the performativity of economics). But by this he seems also to 
follow mainstream economics.
23 And it is a model, even when Callon (1999, 194) insists that ANT is not a theory.
24 This shows that money cannot easily be understood as a mere “sign” (on the 
sign- theories of money, see Hutter 1995).
25 See also Latour (1999, 289– 90) on the Marxist critique of commodity fetishism. 
It has to be underlined that he is apparently familiar with a rather traditional 
version of Marxian theory: there is no indication that he is aware of newer 
theoretical approaches, e.g. the critique of value, although similar approaches 
exist in France. See Vincent (1997).
26 One example of such an investigation might be Preda (2006).
27 The situation is complicated by the fact that at least some forms of money in 
turn presuppose other immutable mobiles, such as security technology, etc. 
However, these in turn then presuppose money. It may be the case that the 
totality also has to be described as a kind of interdependent accretion (rather 
than as an addition), in which, however, money is ultimately, unlike other 
immutable mobiles, never dispensable— which is where the asymmetry would 
reside.
28 It is a separate question whether it always makes sense to talk of accumulating 
centers of calculation in relation to all other kinds of immutable mobiles. One 
gains the impression that the strongly centralized form of the French state has 
left its mark here.
29 Already in the title of Latour’s famous study Science in Action: How to Follow 
Scientists and Engineers through Society (1987), it is made clear that “scientists” 
and “engineers” are the focus of observation. Schüttpelz (2009, 93) also talks of 
the “bureaucratic archive[s] of large, powerful organizations.”
30 Although Latour insists on the visual aspects, it might be possible that im-
mutable mobiles also have auditory, tactile, and other aspects. But perhaps the 
concept of the “immutable mobile” is somewhat oculocentric.
31 To be fair, Callon (2007, 350– 51) also mentions in passing experimentation in 
cooperative forms.
32 See also Callon (1999, 181): “The most important is that ANT is based on no 
stable theory of the actor; in other words, it assumes the radical indeterminacy 
of the actor. For example, neither the actor’s size nor its psychological make- up 
nor the motivations behind its actions are predetermined.”
33 See Latour (1988, point 3.4.9) on the rejection of “nature” as origin. See also 
Latour (2005, 93): “In effect, what ANT was trying to modify was simply the use 
111of the whole critical repertoire by abandoning simultaneously the use of Na-
ture and the use of Society, which had been invented to reveal ‘behind’ social 
phenomena what was ‘really taking place.’”
34 See Potthast and Guggenheim (2015, 9) on the point that, for Latour, “the 
concept of network . . . refers to an ahistorical mode of connecting humans and 
non- humans.”
35 See Latour (2005, 136– 40) critically on “critique.” See Callon regarding econom-
ics: “There are . . . positions we have to abandon. The first is the idea of critique 
of hard economists, which is intended to show them that [they] are wrong” (in 
Barry and Slater 2002, 301).
36 See Nelson (2012), who as a political activist explicitly criticizes the idea of 
money as a “neutral tool.”
37 See http://nach-dem-geld.de. A publication in English is in preparation.
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